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THE PATH OF THE BLOCKCHAIN LEXICON (AND THE LAW)
ANGELA

WALCH*

Abstract

"

The terminology aroundblockchain technology is notoriously
confusing, with disputes over whether a blockchain is the same as a
distributed ledger or whether an appcoin is the same as a protocol
token. In this article, I examine the difficulties the rapidly shifting,
contested vocabulary poses for regulators seeking to understand,
govern, and potentially use blockchain technology, and offer
suggestionsfor how to fight through the haze of unclear language.
In Part II, I provide examples of the fluctuating, contested
language in the blockchain technology space, and describe the forces
atplay in shaping the language. In PartIII, I lay out the problems the
language raisesfor regulators, including challenges in identifying the
facts about the technology, distinguishingamong the many variations
of the technology, and communicating clearly about the technology,
as well as increasing the chances of regulatory capture, inconsistent
regulation acrossjurisdictions and subject domains, and "perverse
innovation.
In PartIV I closely analyze the use of the term "immutable"
in blockchain discourse, to illuminate the confusion a single term
can cause for regulators (and the public at large). I argue that the
widespread use of the term "immutable" as a defining feature of
blockchain technology is misleading, given that (1) real world events
have demonstrated that the unchangeable nature of a blockchain
record is always limited by the decisions of its human governors to
change it, and (2) the source of a blockchain record's "immutability"
* Associate Professor at St. Mary's University School of Law. Research Fellow at the Centre for Blockchain Technologies at University College London.
A.B. Harvard, 1998. J.D. Harvard, 2002. Thank you to Anat Admati, Hilary
Allen, Greg Baden, John Beccia, lan Grigg, Emma Jordan, Victoria Lemieux,
Patricia McCoy, Matthew Reed, Tim Swanson, Steve Wilson, Aaron Wright,
Vlad Zamfir, editors of the Review of Banking FinancialLaw, and participants in the Review ofBanking and FinancialLaw &2017 Symposium on the
Law of FinTech for helpful feedback on the piece. I am grateful to St. Mary's
University School of Law for a publication grant that funded my work on this
piece, and to Andr6s Gonzalez for terrific research assistance. I also thank my
husband, Scott Russell, for his support and insights.
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is disputed, meaning that it is unclearwhether any particularvariation
of the technology may befairly describedas creating an "immutable"
record. This is problematicas regulators have already begun to craft
legislation describing the records created by blockchain technology
as immutable, and are making decisions to use the technology in large
partbecause of its "immutability."
In Part V I suggest ways regulators can become better
educated about blockchain technology, as is essential to responsibly
govern or use the technology. I also recommend that regulatorstake a
highly critical approach that (1) seeks to separate hype from reality;
(2) is sensitive to how incentives may shape the way blockchain
technology is portrayedby industry and those sponsored by industry,
andhow misleading terminologyappearsin publicationsofthe highest
prestige levels; (3) includes diverse perspectivesfrom proponentsand
critics of the technology, multiple disciplines, and across the gender
race, geographic, and economic development spectrums; (4) takes
nothing, including descriptions of the technology itself atface value,
but deeply interrogatesand scrutinizes the technology and its stated
capabilities;and (5) asks regulatorsto think for themselves about the
technology and its benefits ratherthan succumbing to herd behavior
I am hopeful that these recommendations, coupled with
awareness that blockchain vocabulary is treacherous, can help
regulators to discover the facts about blockchain technology and
respond to them appropriately
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Introduction

On January 8, 1897, "the most important event in American
legal history to have taken place at Boston University School of Law"
occurred.' Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., then an Associate Justice of
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, delivered a speech entitled
The Path of the Law to a group of law students, faculty, judges, and
practicing attorneys. 2 Touching on many themes that foreshadowed
the Legal Realism movement, the speech became a classic of legal

' David J. Seipp, Holmes' Path, 77 B.U. L. REv. 515 (1997). Note that when
Professor Seipp made this claim in 1997, the Review ofBanking & Financial
Law's 2017 Law of FinTech Symposium had not yet occurred.
2Id. at 546-48.
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theory.3 In the speech, Holmes explored the "unnecessary confusion"
created by the use of legal terms that carry the baggage of "moral
significance" and "ethical associations."' He noted that, "[t]he law
is full of phraseology drawn from morals, and by the mere force of
language continually invites us to pass from one domain to the other
without perceiving it, as we are sure to do unless we have the boundary
constantly before our minds."' Holmes speculated
whether it would not be a gain if every word of moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other words adopted which should convey
legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law.
We should lose the fossil records of a good deal of
history and the majesty got from ethical associations,
but by ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion
we should gain very much in the clearness of our
thought.6
One hundred twenty years later at a FinTech Symposium at
Boston University School of Law, Holmes' insights into the problems
indeterminate language creates for law remain relevant. This article
picks up on the linguistic challenges identified by Holmes, and
explores the confusion they can sow for regulators and policymakers
grappling with blockchain technology.
As many have discussed, regulators face numerous challenges
in approaching blockchain technology,] whether in the world of
3 GERALD

J.

POSTEMA,

11

LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE

43 (2011) ("This language would decisively shape and
direct American legal theory in the twentieth century. "The Path of Law"
quickly acquired the status of a classic, one of the most influential pieces of
jurisprudential writing in English in the twentieth century . . . .").
I Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457,
464 (1897).
5 Id. at 459-60.
6Id. at 464.
In the remainder of this article, I use the term "regulators" as shorthand
for lawmakers, regulators, and other policymakers. Commentators have offered a plethora of suggestions to regulators on when and how to regulate
blockchain technology. See, e.g., Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin To
An Endogenous Theory OfDecentralizedLedger Technology Regulation:An
Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 193 (2016) (proposing an "endogenous theory of regulation," under which that regulators would pass laws and
COMMON LAW WORLD
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finance or in the multiplicity of other social systems the technology is
predicted to transform.' The regulatory dilemmas include the classic
one when approaching innovative technologies or practices: finding
just the right moment to regulate, such that regulation is available
immediately when people need to be protected and to have guidance
in how to structure their businesses, but not so early that regulation
inappropriately inhibits innovation and the possibility of new jobs
or industries.9 Blockchain technology, along with most of the fintech
practices considered in this Symposium, certainly has generated this
struggle for regulators.10
In this article, however, I focus on a less-discussed dilemma:
the fast-moving vocabulary around blockchain technology, and the
challenges this unstable verbal terrain poses for regulators (not to
mention those developing the technology and deciding whether it
implement them directly in the software code of DLTs by working with the
DLT's software developers and network); Kevin V Tu & Michael W. Meredith, Rethinking Virtual CurrencyRegulation in the BitcoinAge, 90 WASH. L.
REV. 271 (2015) (suggesting that policymakers should think creatively about
how to enact new or modified regulations for virtual currency that advance
existing regulatory objectives in order to "foster the creation of a more effective legal framework").
I Proponents of blockchain technology as a record-keeping technology predict that it will disrupt property records, voting, government benefits administration, academic and identity records, supply chain management, and
virtually every single system that keeps track of anything. For a rosy and
wide-ranging overview of the possibilities of the technology, see generally,
DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION (2016) (exploring
the various potential uses and positive impact of blockchain technology).
9This dilemma is known as the "pacing problem" in regulating innovation.
See Mark Fenwick et al., Regulation Tomorrow: What Happens When Technology is Faster than the Law? (Tilburg Univ., TILEC Discussion Paper
No. 2016-024, 2016), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
id=2834531 [https://perma.cc/8SGF-UBKU] (providing an overview of how
innovative practices and technologies create regulatory challenges).
o See, e.g., Oz Shy, Can eCash & Virtual Currency Compete with Other Electronic Payments: Presented at the Accredited Standards Committee X9 All
Committees Meetings of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (Oct. 22,
2014), https://drive.google.com/file/d/OBwlE11OCYALJY1NNRORfTk9NQXhlYXJKV3pWaE5WNlo2RFVv/view
[https://perma.cc/7EQJ-U4FX]
(stating that the longstanding Federal Reserve position on virtual currency
was that "regulators should be careful not to inhibit experimentation and
growth of innovative payment technologies").
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is appropriate for their needs)." This issue is significant for fintech
law in that blockchain technology is being actively considered and
experimented with for use in practically every financial practice and
system, from central bank digital currencies, to clearing and settlement
systems, to cross-border payments and beyond.1 2 So, the unsettled
vocabulary is relevant to how financial regulators understand, discuss,
and ultimately regulate (or not) the technology or its uses, as well
as how courts will interpret any regulation or regulatory guidance in
the future. However, the vocabulary problems are also more broadly
applicable to any regulators evaluating the technology, including
those outside the financial sector, as well as to groups considering
implementing the technology in whatever domain. 1 3
" In a separate project, I explore the systemic risks that may be created due
to misunderstandings about blockchain technology that stem from communication and language problems. See Angela Walch, Communication Problems
and Systemic Risk: How Imprecise Language Could Taint System-Wide Decisions on Blockchain Technology (Jan. 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
12 For an optimistic vision of how blockchain technology will transform the
financial system, see WORLD ECON. FORUM, THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE (2016), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEFThefutureof_financialinfrastructure.pdf [https://penna.cc/JR5D-9PPT] (examining the
ways in which distributed ledger technology could revolutionize financial
services).
13 The private sector is not alone in considering using blockchain technology.
A number of governments have announced that they are trialing or implementing blockchain technology in various government systems. See, e.g.,
Michael del Castillo, Illinois Joins R3, Unveils Expansive Blockchain Support Plan, CoINDESK (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.coindesk.com/illinois-government-unveils-expansive-blockchain-industry-support-plan/
[https://
pena.cc/MV3W-NFKG] (describing a "sweeping plan" by Illinois to implement blockchain solutions in various government agencies); DubaiLaunches
Blockchain Strategy to Become Paperlessby 2020, GULF NEWS (Oct. 5, 2016),
http://gulfnews.com/news/uae/government/dubai-launches-blockchain-stmtegy-to-become-paperless-by-2020-1.1907790

[https://perma.cc/D8VZ-

YNAW] (examining Dubai's efforts to shift all transactions to blockchain
records and thereby become paperless); Jonathan Keane, Sweden Moves to
Next Stage With Blockchain Land Registry, CoINDESK (Mar. 31, 2017), http://
www.coindesk.com/sweden-moves-next-stage-blockchain-land-registry/
[https://perma.cc/E5MT-89XD] (explaining Sweden's trial use of blockchain
technology to record property transactions); Andrea Tinianow et al., Opinion,
Delaware&2017 Resolution: Make Blockchain a Reality, CoINDESK (Jan. 3,
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In Part II of this article, I provide a high-level overview of the
contested lexicon of blockchain technology and the forces contributing
to its state of flux. In Part III, I outline some of the problems this creates
for regulators. To help crystallize the confusion potentially spawned
by a fluctuating, contested vocabulary, in Part IV, I analyze the use
of a key term from blockchain technology: "immutable." Finally, in
Part V, I suggest ways regulators could mitigate the difficulties in
understanding and assessing the risks and benefits of the technology.
II.

Blockchain Technology's Unsettled Terminology

The vocabulary used in the blockchain technology-er,
DLT-I mean SLT-space is notoriously confusing. A quick sampling
of just some of the blockchain lingo makes the point:
*

Blockchain technology, sometimes called "the blockchain" or
just "blockchain," is alternatively referred to as "distributed
ledger technology" (DLT)," "shared ledger technology"
(SLT)," "consensus ledger" technology, 1 6 "mutual distributed

2017), http://www.coindesk.com/what-expect-delaware-blockchain-initiative-2017/ [https://pena.cc/H5W5-D9TA] (detailing Delaware's efforts to
implement blockchain technology).
1" See, e.g., Andrea Pinna & Wiebe Ruttenberg, DistributedLedger Technologies in Securities Post-Trading, (European Cent. Bank, Occasional Paper
No. 172, 2016), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbopl72.en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/68U5-C93N] (discussing how DLTs could be used in securities post-trading).
15 David Birch of Consult Hyperion has pushed for the "shared ledger technology" term. See, e.g., David Birch, Shared Ledger Technology and the
Future of Banks (from 1956), DISRUPTIVE VIEWs (Feb. 11, 2016), https://disruptiveviews.com/shared-ledger-technology-future-banks-1956/ [https://perma.cc/9664-DAUF] ("[T]here is at least the possibility that SLT will indeed
achieve impossible improvements in banking operations.").
16 See, e.g., Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 14, at 9 ("Other DLTs are referred
to as consensus ledgers, as they do not keep track of the history of transactions but instead operate on the basis of consensus reached on a ledger of accounts, which are updated with new transactions at each validation round.").
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ledger" technology,1 7 or even a decentralized or "distributed
database."1
*

There are "public blockchains" (also called "permissionless
blockchains"
or "open blockchains") and "private
blockchains" (also called "permissioned blockchains" or
"closed blockchains").1 9 Of course, one can substitute "DLTs"
for "blockchains" throughout the preceding sentence. There
are also "restricted" and "unrestricted" DLTs. 2 0

*

There are various parties involved in operating these databases
or ledgers that are sometimes called "miners "21 and other
times "nodes"22 or "validators."23 Of course, some of the

'7 See, e.g., Michael Mainelli & Alistair Milne, The Impact and Potential of
Blockchain on the Securities Transaction Lifecycle (SWIFT Inst., Working
Paper No. 2015-007, 2016), https://ssm.com/abstract=2777404 [https://perma.cc/HG47-BGPL] (referring to blockchain technology as "mutual distributed ledger" technology).
18 See, e.g., Sebastien Meunier, Blockchain Technology-a Very Special
Kind of DistributedDatabase (Dec. 29, 2016), https://medium.com/a sbmeunier/blockchain-technology-a-very-special-kind-of-distributed-database-e63d00781118#.oywrg7qOr [https://perna.cc/W62T-KEEX] (providing
a taxonomy of distributed database technology, including blockchain technology).
'9 See, e.g., BITFURY GRP. & JEFF GARZIK, PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE BLOCKCHAINS
(2015), http://www.the-blockchain.com/docs/Jeff%/20Garzik%/`2OPublic%/`20
vs%20Private%20Blockchain/o2Optl.pdf [https://pena.cc/F9YH-W4VD]
(describing permissioned and permissionless blockchains, and pros and cons
of each).
20 See, e.g., Pinna & Ruttenberg, supra note 14, at 11 (explaining the characteristics of restricted and unrestricted DLTs).
21 See, e.g., ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, MASTERING BITCOIN: UNLOCKING
DIG-

ITAL CRYPTOCURRENCIES 173-74 (2014).

See, e.g., id at 179.
See, e.g., Antony Lewis, A Gentle Introduction to Blockchain Technology,
BITS ON BLOCKS (Sept. 9, 2015), https://bitsonblocks.net/2015/09/09/a-gentle-introduction-to-blockchain-technology/
[https://penna.cc/UQ8F-6CZ5]
("Important members of the network are called validators or nodes which
pass around transaction data (payments) and block data (additions to the ledger.").
22
23

2016-2017
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nodes might be "partial" (as opposed to "full function"), 24 and
some of the miners might be in a "mining pool." 25
There are "virtual currencies ,"26 "digital currencies, "27
"central bank digital currencies" (which may or may not
use blockchain technology at some point), 28 in addition to
.cryptocurrencies,"29 "tokens,"30 "protocol tokens31 "app
coins,"32 "alt-coins ,33 and "meta-coins." 3 4

24

See, e.g.,

MARC SEL

& MARLEEN

MOUTON,

PwC,

BLOCKCHAIN

&

ITS AP-

(2016), https://www.pwc.be/en/documents/20161122-blockchain-and-applications-financial-services.pdf [https://
penna.cc/5Q7R-CQ54] (distinguishing partial nodes from full function
nodes).
25 See, e.g., ANTONOPOULOS, supra note 21, at 207-10.
26 See, e.g., Dong He et al., Virtual Currenciesand Beyond: Initial Considerations 7 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Staff Discussion Note No. 16/03, 2016),
https://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdnl603.pdf [https://penma.
cc/4KZG-DKBS] (defining virtual currencies).
27 See, e.g., id. at 7-8 (describing the difference between virtual currencies
and digital currencies).
28 See, e.g., Max Raskin & David Yernack, Digital Currencies, Decentralized Ledgers, and The Future of CentralBanking, 10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 22238, 2016) (discussing the possibility of
central bank digital currencies) (forthcoming in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CENTRAL BANKING (Peter Conti-Brown & Rosa Lastra eds., 2017)).
29 See, e.g., He et al., supra note 26, at 9 (identifying and explaining cryptocurrencies).
30 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 23 (explaining the basics of tokens).
31 See, e.g., Will Warren, The Difference Between App Coins andProtocol Tokens, MEDIUM (Feb. 2, 2017), https://mediun.com/Ox-project/the-differencebetween-app-coins-and-protocol-tokens-7281a428348c#.gdpfgrh7y [https://
penna.cc/E7LV-T73Y] (comparing and contrasting app coins and protocol
tokens).
32 See, e.g., id. (comparing and contrasting app coins and protocol tokens).
33 See, e.g., Peter Van Valkenburgh, What are Forks, Alt-coins, Meta-coins,
and Sidechains?, COIN CENTER (Dec. 8, 2015), https://coincenter.org/entry/
what-are-forks-alt-coins-meta-coins-and-sidechains [https://pena.cc/JC33KJ9K] (explaining certain terminology and "technical concepts from the ever-changing universe of Bitcoin-derived innovations").
34 See, e.g., id. (discussing the basics of meta-coins).
PLICATION

IN

FINANCIAL

SERVICES
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And whatever the technology is called, people say it is
"immutable,"

35

"trustless ,"36 and "secure."

37

The terms listed above might refer to the same thing, or almost
the same thing, or something closely related, or even something
completely opposite. While there are language guides and explainers

See, e.g., Andrea Tinianow & Caitlin Long, Delaware Blockchain Initiative: Transforming the FoundationalInfrastructure of CorporateFinance,
HARv. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 16, 2017), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/16/delaware-blockchain-initiative-transforming-the-foundational-infrastructure-of-corporate-finance/
[https://
penna.cc/3WX7-253P] ("Distributed ledgers . .
create a single record of
tmnsactions among multiple parties, providing one immutable, "golden
copy" of data that all parties see at the same time and can trust as valid.");
Marc Pilkington, Blockchain Technology: Principles & Applications, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON DIGITAL TRANSFORMATIONS 15 (F. Xavier Olleros
Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016) ("Immutability is a characteristic of blockchain
&

35

technology.");

CHAMBER OF DIG. COMMERCE

&

AT GEORGETOWN UNIV. McDONOUGH SCH. OF
CIAL INCLUSION 8

(2017) [hereinafter

CTR. FOR FIN. MKTS.

Bus.,

&

POLICY

BLOCKCHAIN AND FINAN-

BLOCKCHAIN AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION],

http://finpolicy.georgetown.edu/sites/finpolicy.georgetown.edu/files/Blockchain%/o20and%/`20Financial%/`20Inclusion%/2012O417.pdf
[https://penma.
cc/9Q5B-35S9] ("The disruptive component of blockchain technology is that
its core functionality depends on the creation of an immutable ledger...").
36 See, e.g., Sinclair Davidson et al., Economics of Blockchain (2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssm.com/abstract=2744751 [https://pena.
cc/P5CZ-K4TT] ("The blockchain technology is trustless .... ) (emphasis
in original); Trent J. MacDonald et al., Blockchains and the Boundaries of
Self-Organized Economies 8 (2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstractid=2749514
[https://penna.cc/8GPV-BDP8] ("blockchain technology is trustless, meaning that it does not require third party verification (i.e., trust)").
37 See, e.g., Ahmed Banafa, A Secure Model of JoT with Blockchain, MIT
TECH. REV. (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603298/asecure-model-of-iot-with-blockchain/ [https://pena.cc/S7VD-7EVG] (stating in reference to "blockchain, "Most important of all, it's secure"); Stuart
Levi, Blockchains Offer Revolutionary Potential in Fintech and Beyond,
Skadden Arps (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.skadden.com/insights/blockchains-offer-revolutionary-potential-fintech-and-beyond
[https://perma.
cc/7DCV-99QM] ("With blockchains, distributed ledgers provide the same
benefits as a trusted third party, but in a far more efficient and secure manner.").
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that have been produced by different parties within the space,3 8 the
reality is that the terminology is very much evolving. 39 At the moment,
it would be difficult to provide a clear or uncontested definition of any
of the terms above,40 and recent conferences have included discussions
of the unsettled terminology."
This vocabulary free-for-all is due to a number of factors,
some of which include:
*

Word Taint. Certain terminology within the blockchain
and cryptocurrency space has developed undesirable
connotations, and people have introduced new terms to

See, e.g., Van Valkenburgh, supra note 33 (explaining certain terminology
and "technical concepts from the ever-changing universe of Bitcon-derived
innovations"); Meunier, supra note 18 (providing a taxonomy of distributed
database technology and noting the contested definition of a blockchain).
39 As Juri Mattila recently described, "the terminology around the whole phenomenon is still heavily in flux. Caught in the middle of it all, it can be difficult to form a clear picture on blockchain technology and the phenomenon
that surrounds it." Juri Mattila, The Blockchain Phenomenon: The Disruptive Potential of Distributed Consensus Architectures 3 (Berkeley Roundtable of the Int'l Econ., Working Paper 2016-1), http://www.brie.berkeley.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Juri-Mattila-.pdf [https://perma.cc/PWS9GP8H].
4o See Colin Platt, Thoughts on the Taxonomy ofBlockchains & Distributed
Ledger Technologies, MEDIUM (Feb. 27, 2017), https://medium.com/@colin_/thoughts-on-the-taxonomy-of-blockchains-distributed-ledger-technologies-ecadlc819e28#.6gktvnu8k [https://pena.cc/S3M5-KGNS] (proposing
a taxonomy of the different flavors of blockchain technology and distributed
ledger technology); Nelson M. Rosario, Whath in a Name? From Bitcoin to
Blockchain to DistributedLedgers, CoINDESK (Feb. 11, 2017), http://www.
coindesk.com/whats-in-a-name-from-bitcoin-to-blockchain-to-distributedledgers/ [https://perma.cc/9H2V-VR3M]. Cf Peter Van Valkenburgh, Does it
Matter that Different GovernmentAgenciesDefine Bitcoin Differently?, COIN
CENTER (Jan. 11, 2017), https://coincenter.org/entry/does-it-matter-that-different-government-agencies-define-bitcoin-differently
[https://pena.
cc/475V-QTXB] (acknowledging that different government regulators have
categorized Bitcoin differently based on the activity the particular regulator
governs).
" See Construct 2017Agenda, CoIN DESK http://www.coindesk.com/events/
construct-2017/agenda/ [https://pena.cc/F4KH-D2VQ] (acknowledging
that blockchain technology's "universe of verbiage is only becoming more
and more complex and intimidating for newcomers to the space").
38
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avoid the negative associations. 4 2 For instance, references to
"Bitcoin" or "cryptocurrency" were (and still are, in some
cases) associated with crime due to Bitcoin's use in money
laundering and in illicit marketplaces like Silk Road. 4 3 It was
not socially acceptable for banks to use something associated
with the underworld, so the term "blockchain technology"
took hold, possibly in an attempt to sever the ties to "Bitcoin"
and its criminal undertones. Over the past few years, we
have seen an increase in the use of the term "DLT" in lieu of
"blockchain technology," perhaps in response to the extreme
hype around "blockchain technology," in an attempt to sound
more restrained and controlled.
Technology Variations. Blockchain technology emerged in
2008 with Bitcoin, and has been evolving ever since.4 4 Many
new blockchains, both public and private, have been created,
with a variety of features and potential uses. 45 Indeed, once
the financial sector discovered blockchain technology, one
of the biggest transformations that occurred was that an
open network of transaction processors was eschewed for
a private, trusted group of parties to maintain the record,
under defined sets of terms and conditions. 4 6 This was a
The process of contamination and replacement of contaminated terms in
common discourse is a familiar process for linguists. See Edna Andrews, Cultural Sensitivity and PoliticalCorrectness: The Linguistic Problem ofNaming, 71 Am. SPEECH, no. 4, 1996, at 389.
42

43

GOV'T. OFFICE FOR SCIENCE, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND

CHAIN 7 (2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachmentdata/file/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.
pdf [https://perna.cc/YD7Z-995Y].
1* See ANTONOPOULOs, supra note 21, at 3.
15 Ethereum and ZCash are examples of new public blockchains/cryptocurrencies. See ETHEREUM, https://www.ethereum.org/ [https://penna.cc/
HK4A-TALB]; ZCASH, https://z.cash/ [https://penna.cc/MDP7-Y4E7]. Private blockchains (or distributed ledgers) are being created at Digital Asset
Holdings, Monax, and in consortia like R3 and Hyperledger. See DIGITAL
ASSET, https://digitalasset.com/ [https://penna.cc/YAQ9-PM5Z]; HYPERLEDGER, https://www.hyperledger.org/ [https://penna.cc/E6XU-3AY9]; MONAX,
https://monax.io/ [https://penna.cc/5GU4-TM87]; R3, http://www.r3cev.
com/ [https://penna.cc/5D5G-R5TW].
46 See Anna Irrera, The Public vs Private Debate on Blockchain, FIN. NEWS
(Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/blockchain-fintech-theBLOCK
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change to a fundamental feature of the technology, and there
is still great debate among the technologists in the field
over how the attributes of public and private blockchains
differ.17 As variations to the technology have been created,
new terms have been introduced to distinguish new from
existing forms." This is seen clearly with the creation of
the terms "private blockchain," "closed blockchain," and
"permissioned blockchain" to distinguish blockchains with
known transaction validators from those with no barriers to
joining the transaction-validating network.4 9
*

Cross-Field Communications. Blockchain
technology
is incredibly interdisciplinary, and brings together fields
including software engineering, networks, distributed
systems, cryptography,
security, economics, finance,
monetary theory, risk, law, philosophy, ethics, sociology,
psychology, archival and record-keeping studies, and political
science, among others." Thus, people from disparate fields of
expertise often must communicate with one another about the

public-vs-private-debate-20151001 [https://penna.cc/V3GH-8FE6] (reporting that most experimentation with blockchain technology in the banking
sector is of the permissioned variety).
17 For example, there is not yet settled agreement on how the security profile or immutability (permanency) differs in a public versus a private blockchain. See, e.g., Vitalik Buterin, Vitalik Buterin: On Public and Private
Blockchains, CoINDESK (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.coindesk.com/vitalikbuterin-on-public-and-private-blockchains/ [https://pena.cc/E5LG-KXTJ];
Peter Van Valkenburgh, Dir. of Research, Coin Ctr., Comments to the European Securities and Markets Authority on its Consultation on Distributed
Ledger Technology Applied to Securities Markets 2 (Sept. 2, 2016), https://
coincenter.org/files/2016-09/coin-center-letter-to-esma.pdf
[https://perma.
cc/6RV8-ZXRF].
48 See, e.g., Tim Swanson, A Brief History of R3 - the DistributedLedger
Group, GREAT WALL NUMBERS (Feb. 27, 2017), http://www.ofnumbers.
com/2017/02/27/a-brief-history-of-r3-the-distributed-ledger-group/ [https://
perma.cc/ZT3K-N5PT] (describing why R3 uses "distributed ledger" rather
than "blockchain" to describe their technology).
19 See, e.g., BITFURY GRP. & GARZIK, supra note 19; Irrera, supra note 46.
5o See, e.g., VINCENZO MORABITO, BusiNEss INNOVATION THROUGH BLOCKCHAIN:
THE B3 PERSPECTIVE 118 (2017) ("The interdisciplinary nature of blockchain
technology . . lead[s] people to see the technology as primarily belonging to
their own discipline.").
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technology."1 The translation required to speak across fields
can yield flawed understandings, through attempts to use the
vocabulary of one's own field to imperfectly express concepts
from the original field.5 2 For instance, though Bitcoin birthed
the blockchain phenomenon, the word "ledger," now a
common term to refer to the record created by a blockchain
network, does not appear in the original whitepaper that
introduces and explains Bitcoin.5 3 Rather, the term likely
appeared in explanations of the technology to non-technical
people, analogizing the record created by the Bitcoin network
to the more familiar concept of a ledger."4
*

Industry "Pivots. " Related to word contamination and
technology experimentation, the language around blockchain
technology has shifted as the associated startup industry
has "pivoted" (in Silicon Valley parlance) to what is trendy
and likely to attract investment." For instance, as the
terms "blockchain technology" and "DLT" increased in

a' See id.

Achieving clear cross-field communications is a key difficulty in conducting interdisciplinary research, given the jargon and differing knowledge paradigms of the fields involved. See generally L.J. Bmcken & E.A. Oughton,
'What Do You Mean? 'The Importance ofLanguage in DevelopingInterdisciplinaryResearch, 31 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRIT. GEOGRAPHERS 371 (2006).
53 See Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-PeerElectronic Cash System,
BITCOIN
(2008), https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [https://perna.cc/YX4AAFQZ].
1* See, e.g., JOSHUA ASHLEY KLAYMAN & F. DARIO DE MARTINO, MORRISON

&

52

FOERSTER, THE (HEART)BEAT

HAS SOUNDED:

THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM

2-3 (2016), https://media2.mofo.
com/documents/160817-world-economic-forum-blockchain.pdf [https://perma.cc/4F5N-YAEX].
5 See Tim Swanson, The greatpivot? Orjust this yearsfroth?, GREAT WALL
NUMBERS (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.ofnumbers.com/2015/10/16/thegreat-pivot-or-just-this-years-froth/ [https://penna.cc/27QW-5NM3]; Stan
Higgins, ItBit Rebrands as Paxos Amid Blockchain Pivot, CoINDESK (Sept.
14, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/itbit-rebrands-paxos-amid-blockchainpivot/ [https://penna.cc/7F6T-C58W]; Pete Rizzo, Adam Draper; Investors
Don't Want to Hear the Word Bitcoin, CoiNDESK (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.
coindesk.com/adam-draper-investors-bitcoin-blockchain/
[https://penna.
cc/9HGM-KX4T] (discussing the "vernacular change" from "Bitcoin" to
"blockchain" in investor interest).
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popularity over "Bitcoin" and "cryptocurrencies," a number
of startup companies changed both their Bitcoin-based
names and business models to move away from Bitcoin.5 6
One commentator from the R3 consortium has referred to
the tendency of startup companies to market themselves as
"blockchain" companies to attract venture capital funding and
buzz as "chainwashing," arguing that many companies that
refer to themselves as "blockchain" or "distributed ledger"
companies either don't actually use blockchain technology in
their product/service offerings, or don't need to use blockchain
technology to best achieve their customers' goals.17
Fine Tuning. Terminology around blockchain technology has
also changed through efforts to replace words that seemed
misleading or imprecise. For example, there is now a debate
about whether "DLT" or "SLT" more accurately describes the
associated systems."8 Further, some argue that "validators"
or "transaction processors" are more descriptive of the role
played by computers within a blockchain network, than
"miners," as is commonly used with cryptocurrencies like
Bitcoin.5 9 I explore below how the term "immutable" may be
Among the companies that have changed names from a "Bitcoin"-based
name are Itbit (now Paxos), and BitReserve (now Uphold). Id. ("The move
confirms past indications that its leadership was seeking to rebrand to better highlight its private blockchain and distributed ledger work."); Johnathan
Schieber, RebrandingAs Uphold, Bitreserve Says Goodbye To Bitcoin, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 14, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/10/14/rebranding-asuphold-bitreserve-says-goodbye-to-bitcoin/ [https://pena.cc/ZZ5R-56JN]
("The company formerly known as Bitreserve is moving beyond its Bitcoin
roots to become a full-service provider of financial transactions under the
new moniker Uphold.").
5 Tim Swanson, Chainwashing, GREAT WALL NUMBERS (Feb. 13, 2017),
http://www.ofnumbers.com/2017/02/13/chainwashing/
[https://perma.cc/
XQH6-J35A] (commenting on how the "hype cycle" has driven companies
to use various blockchain-related phrases).
58 See, e.g., How To Explain The Value OfReplicated, Shared Ledgers From
First Principles, RICHARD GENDAL BROWN (Apr. 27, 2015), https://gendal.
me/20 15/04/27/how-to-explain-the-value-of-replicated-shared-ledgersfrom-first-principles/ [https://perma.cc/TUA5-N7K5] (explaining shared
ledger technology); Swanson, supra note 48 (explaining distributed ledger
technology).
5 See Irrera, supra note 46 (defining the function of miners); George Sam56
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misleading when used to describe all variations of blockchain
technology,60 and a debate over the meaning of "decentralized"
is ongoing. 61

In short, the language of blockchain technology is evolving
quickly, and the language differences are occurring for reasons both
substantive (i.e., to indicate actual differences) and non-substantive
(e.g., to achieve marketing goals).
III

Terminology Headaches for Regulators

Unsurprisingly, the fluctuating terminology around blockchain
technology can cause difficulties for global regulators seeking to
understand and appropriately govern the technology. 62 This problem
is not unique to blockchain technology, but occurs across fields and
with any new technology or practice. It takes time for people to figure
out how to talk consistently about a new topic, and many times, we
never do.
In this Part III, I outline some of the particular challenges
and risks the unsettled terminology of blockchain technology poses
for regulators. These include challenges with (1) understanding the
technology, (2) identifying and distinguishing the different variants
of the technology, (3) crafting precise language to regulate the
technology. The problematic vocabulary also increases the chances of
(1) regulatory capture (and the risks that accompany it), (2) inconsistent

man, How TransactionsAre Validated On A DistributedLedger, SAMMANTICS
(Mar. 8, 2016), http://sammantics.com/blog/2016/3/6/how-transactions-arevalidated-on-a-shared-ledger [https://perna.cc/9LBU-MD79] (defining the
functionality of validators).
60 See Part IV infra.
61 See Vitalik Buterin, The Meaning of
Decentralization,MEDIUM (Feb. 6,
2017), https://medium.com/@VitalikButerin/the-meaning-of-decentralization-aOc92b76a274#.oz2xbOyxx [https://perma.cc/N8PC-MlX3F].
62 In discussing the challenges blockchain technology's moving vocabulary
poses for regulators, I do not mean to suggest that regulators should or will
regulate the technology itself directly. Rather, because the technology is being described as a "platform" technology that could potentially be used for
countless social practices, it is important for regulators to deeply understand
the workings of the technology, in order to anticipate how its use might impact activities within their remit.
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regulation across subject-matter domains and jurisdictions, and (3)
"perverse innovation." 63 I describe each of these in more detail below.
First, a fluid, contested vocabulary makes it difficult to
understand blockchain technology. It is extremely challenging, even
several years after blockchain technology appeared on regulators' radar
screens, to follow the discussion and practices around the technology
when its vocabulary is so malleable and potentially misleading. How
can regulators (or anyone else) even tell whether people are discussing
the same topic or manifestation of technology when people explain
the technology, its risks, and its potential benefits using divergent
terminologies? (This is assuming that regulators have the subjectmatter expertise necessary to deeply understand the complex nature
of the technology, with its blend of cryptography, game theory, and
multiple other domains.) The realization that vocabulary could be
creating and masking misunderstandings about the technology has
only just begun to dawn on the finance industry, with one influential
fintech pundit recently acknowledging that inappropriate conflation of
different forms of the technology was occurring due to imprecise use
of language .64
This challenge is what scholars of the regulation of innovation
call the difficulty of nailing down the "facts" about a technology
so that it can be regulated appropriately. 65 If regulators can't figure
out what the facts are, or misunderstand them, then they can't fully
identify or quantify the risks posed by the technology, and are more
likely to make bad decisions about whether and how to regulate. This
means that regulators will have to do a lot more work to reveal the
facts, and that it is essential for them to take a critical approach, as I
explore in Part V.
Second, and related to difficulties in understanding the
technology, are challenges with identifying each variant of the
technology with precision. Regulators must be able to assess the risks
and benefits of each form of the technology, to determine which forms
See Dan Burk, Perverse Innovation, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2016).
See Penny Crosman, Blockchain Misreads Could Set Banks Up for Mistakes, AM. BANKER (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/
63

64

news/blockchain-misreads-could-set-banks-up-for-mistakes [https://pena.
cc/5A3Y-49VW] (reporting that "vocabulary mix-ups are rampant").
65 See Fenwick et al., supra note 9 (discussing the need for regulators to decide relevant facts before "deciding what, when and how they should make a
regulatory intervention").
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should be treated alike, and which should be treated differently. For
example, are public and private blockchains different enough from one
another that they should be managed differently by regulators? What
about distributed ledgers that use varying "consensus mechanisms" to
agree on the truth of the ledger? Making these types of determinations
is much more difficult if vocabulary acts as a barier to, rather than a
facilitator of, understanding.
Third, rapidly shifting terminology makes it more difficult for
regulators themselves to communicate about blockchain technology,
whether through reports, white papers, speeches, or regulation. How
does one craft the definitions section of a regulation seeking to address
blockchain technology when both words and technology are still in
flux? A meaning or terminology shift after a regulation is crafted could
result in a poor fit between the regulation and the regulated practice,
which could undermine the regulation and regulator itself
We have seen this particular challenge play out in the
difficulties regulators have had with the term "virtual currencies."
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies were commonly referred to as
"virtual currencies" during the first few years of Bitcoin's existence.
For instance, in October 2012, the European Central Bank (ECB)
defined virtual currency as "a type of unregulated, digital money,
which is issued and usually controlled by its developers, and used and
accepted among the members of a specific virtual community." 6 6 It
also noted that "[t]his definition may need to be adapted in future if
fundamental characteristics change." 6 7 Things did indeed change, and
in February 2015, the ECB revised its definition of "virtual currency"
to "a digital representation of value, not issued by a central bank, credit
institution or e-money institution, which, in some circumstances,
can be used as an alternative to money." 68 As a further example of
regulators' difficulty keeping up with the language of blockchain
technology, New York State referred to its 2015 tailored licensing
scheme for virtual currency money transmission issues as the "Bit

66 EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 5

(2012), http://www.

ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes2012lOen.pdf
penna.cc/DF76-FG6P].
67

[https://

Id

A FURTHER ANALYSIS
25 (2015), http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemesen.pdf [https://penna.cc/BMK2-3RGD].
68 EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES:
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License ."69 The name now seems quite dated as companies using
variants of the technology have been busy deleting "bit" from their
names and "pivoting" to something new.70
As lawyers know, the language problems I have just discussed
may result in interpretive problems down the road, as regulators,
companies, lawyers, and the courts decipher actions (e.g., regulation
or guidance) taken by regulators in regards to blockchain technology.
For example, if the technology is rapidly evolving as regulations
are drafted, a blockchain technology company might argue that the
regulation is inapplicable to its variant of the technology, even though
its technology raises similar policy concerns.
For good reason, lawyers and the law are deeply concerned
with achieving accuracy and precision in the use of language, 7 and
although law comes equipped with tools to interpret problematic
language (e.g., canons of statutory construction 7 2 and rules for
contract interpretation), 7 3 good drafters strive for precision generally
and ambiguity only by choice. A fluid terminology in the subject being
regulated makes this even more difficult than usual.
In addition to making it hard for regulators to deeply
understand the technology and craft regulation, an unstable vocabulary
can increase the risk of undesirable regulatory outcomes.
First, the lack of a clear vocabulary around blockchain
technology increases regulators' need (real or perceived) to rely on
industry experts to explain the technology to them, as they may feel
unable to make sense of it on their own. This dependence greatly
increases the risk of regulatory capture, with all the consequences
that may bring, such as errant risk analysis, and a tendency to underSee, e.g., BitLicense FrequentlyAsked Questions, N.Y STATE DEP'T OF FIN.
SERVS., http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/bitlicense
reg framework_
faq.htm [https://perma.cc/UM4S-6VJG].
7o See, e.g., supra note 56 (listing companies that have rebranded).
7 Clarity in law allows those governed to understand the law, accurately
predict how to comply with the law, and undertake useful cost-benefit analyses to determine whether or not to comply. Ambiguous laws have the opposite consequence, leading to uncertainty in those governed and difficulty in
structuring behavior in relation to the law, potentially resulting in the loss of
beneficial activity due to this uncertainty paralysis.
72 See generally Cass Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regulatory State,
103 HARv. L. REV. 405 (1989) (discussing principles of statutory interpretation, including the canons of statutory construction).
73 See 11 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 31:1 (4th ed.).
69
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regulate .7 "Regulatory capture occurs when bureaucrats, regulators
and politicians cease to serve some notion of a wider collective
public interest and begin to systematically favour specific vested
interests, usually the very interests they were supposed to regulate
and restrain for the wider public interest."7 It is very easy for
supporters of a complex new technology or practice to hype the perks
of the technology while downplaying the risks or glossing over them
entirely. 76 The complexity and highly technical nature of blockchain
technology may make regulators more inclined to take industry claims
at face value, particularly since they may be out of their depth given
the technology's highly interdisciplinary, abstruse nature. The opacity
of blockchain technology is similar to that of the complex financial
products, algorithms, and risk models that helped to spawn the
financial crisis, when people in the financial sector blithely assembled
complexity without truly understanding what they were doing, and
seemingly disregarded the potential implications of their actions.77
Regarding the risk models and corresponding financial products that
contributed to the financial crisis, Erik Gerding has argued that "[r]
egulators were both daunted by the complexity posed by new financial
7 See Andrew Baker, RestrainingRegulatory Capture?Anglo-America, Crisis Politics and Trajectoriesof Change in Global FinancialGovernance, 86
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, No. 3, 2010, at 647, 647-63 (discussing the role that
capture of financial regulators by the financial industry played in creating
the Financial Crisis, and post-Crisis steps taken to mitigate the possibility of
future capture).

7

1

d. at 648.

For example, neither investors, board members, nor those contracting with
the blood-testing company Theranos performed adequate due diligence on its
technology to understand its true capabilities and risks. See Nick Bilton, How
Elizabeth Holmes'Houseof CardsCame Tumbling Down, VANITY FAIR (Oct.
2016),
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/09/elizabeth-holmes-theranos-exclusive [https://perma.cc/CN6J-WRBJ].
7 See generally SCOTT PATTERSON, THE QUANTS: HOW A NEW BREED OF MATH
WHIZZES CONQUERED WALL STREET AND NEARLY DESTROYED IT (2010) (describing how the use of algorithms and complicated financial structures contributed to the 2008 financial crisis); Erik Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open
Source: The Outsourcing of FinancialRegulation to Risk Models and the
Global FinancialCrisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127 (2009) (describing how regulators bought into the belief that the financial sectors' complex risk models
and financial products could adequately manage risk, and how problems with
the models contributed to the financial crisis).
76
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instruments and awed by the promise of new financial engineering
to shift and spread risk efficiently."7 ' There is similar potential for
regulators to be daunted and awed by blockchain technology, as it
is extraordinarily complex and purportedly will solve virtually every
problem that regulators and the financial sector (and the world at

large) have. 79
Further, the potential for regulatory capture seems enhanced
with blockchain technology, given the great number of prominent
former regulators and financial industry players who have taken
executive or advisory roles with blockchain technology companies
or lobbying organizations," and who are now explaining the
technology to current regulators and advocating for its adoption in
Gerding, supra note 77, at 134.
7 See Angela Walch, Open Source OperationalRisk: Should Public Blockchains Serve as FinancialMarket Infrastructures?,in 2 HANDBOOK OF BLOCKCHAIN, DIGITAL FINANCE, AND INCLUSION (David Lee Kuo Chen & Robert Deng,
eds.), (forthcoming 2017), https://ssm.com/abstract=2879239 [https://penna.
cc/LXP8-HAHD].
so See, e.g., TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 8, at 8 (stating that "Ben Lawsky
quit his job as the superintendent of financial services for New York State to
build an advisory company in [the blockchain technology] space"); Arthur
Levitt Advises Bitcoin Companies: BitPay and Vaurum, BusINEssWIRE (Oct.
28, 2014),_http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20141028005244/en!
Arthur-Levitt-Advises-Bitcoin-Companies-BitPay-Vaurum#.Vgye8ctViko
[https://pena.cc/9B66-J9DY] (reporting that Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, will serve as an advisor
to BitPay (a Bitcoin payment processor) and Vaurum (a Bitcoin exchange));
Michael Casey, Bitcoin Startup 21 Unveils ProductPlan: Embeddable Mining Chips, Dow JONES INST. NEWs (May 18, 2015) (reporting that Lawrence
Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury, has joined the advisory board
of 21 Inc., a Bitcoin company seeking to produce an "embedded mining
chip"); Nathaniel Popper, ItBit Bitcoin Exchange Gets Banking License in
New York, A First in U.S., N.Y TInES (May 7, 2015), https://www.nytimes.
com/2015/05/08/business/dealbook/bitcoin-exchange-receives-first-licensein-new-york-state.html?_r-0 [https://pena.cc/7KQN-6YGV] (reporting
that Sheila Bair, former chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had been appointed a board member of ItBit, a Bitcoin exchange);
About Us, DIG. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, https://digitalchamber.org/about/
[https://penna.cc/U8E4-WC7D] (listing Mark Wetjen, former commissioner
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, as a member of the Board
of Advisors of the Digital Chamber of Commerce, "the world's leading trade
organization representing the digital asset and blockchain industry").
78

734

REVIEW OF BANKING

& FINANCIAL

LAW

VOL. 36

various settings." Regulators may have personal relationships with
those advocating for blockchain technology, and may also be awed
by the status and prestige of the people supporting the technology,
increasing the potential for regulators to be influenced by industry
without adequately interrogating the technology and its implications.82
With the blockchain hype cycle in full force, it has become taboo to
express skepticism about the technology's benefits or concern about
its potential risks,8 3 which is a clear recipe for groupthink.
Second, a diverging terminology can lead to inconsistent
regulation across jurisdictions or subject matter areas, due to different
ways of talking about (and potentially different understandings
of) the technology, rather than differing underlying policy choices
by regulators. Such a scenario could make it much more difficult
for regulated parties to comply with disparate regulations, thereby
undermining the policy objectives regulators hope to achieve. At the
same time, having to navigate multiple inconsistent regulatory regimes
greatly increases the costs of regulated parties, and could result in
unintended stifling of innovation. 4 Finally, inconsistent regulation can
1 This is the "revolving door" problem that has been widely discussed, as
people pass from working for the regulator to working for or on behalf of
regulated parties, and potentially back to working for the regulator, ad infinitum. See ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS' NEW CLOTHES
204-05 (2013).
82 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving In to Wall Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283 1417-18 (2013) (citations
omitted) ("[E]xtensive professional and social contacts encourage regulators
to align themselves with the outlook of industry officials, a phenomenon that
analysts have described as "cultural capture" and "cognitive capture.". . . The
likelihood of cultural capture increases when (i) financial regulators feel part
of an "in-group" with industry executives due to close professional contacts
and shared "social networks," and (ii) regulators view industry insiders as
occupying a "higher status" based on wealth, intellectual achievement and
social prominence.").
83 See VICTORIA L. LEMIEUX, Soc. Sc. & HUMANITIES RESEARCH COUNCIL OF
CAN., BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY FOR RECORDKEEPING: HELP OR HYPE? (2016)
(noting that "critical commentators online have received strong negative
feedback from a blockchain technology 'fan base"').
84 This issue is familiar to cryptocurrency actors in the blockchain space, as it
has been raised by the panoply of U.S. state and federal laws governing money transmission. Cryptocurrency advocates have participated in the Uniform
Law Commission's initiative to draft the Uniform Regulation of Virtual Currency Businesses Act and have proposed guidance for state money transmis-
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spawn forum shopping and regulatory arbitrage, with regulated parties
seeking to exploit differences in regulation across jurisdictions.
Third, regulating a technology with a rapidly shifting
vocabulary can prompt regulated actors to tweak the technology
to avoid regulatory burdens. Dan Burk recently termed this type of
tinkering "perverse innovation," as the technological innovation stems
from the attempt to avoid regulation (i.e., to fall into a loophole in
the regulation)." This may be a desirable outcome of regulation, but
it can be undesirable if regulation sends the technology down a less
fruitful path than it would otherwise have taken. This issue relates to
the classic regulatory dilemma of when it is best to regulate.
With all of these challenges, Holmes' idea of striking certain
words from law's lexicon doesn't look so bad, as one is tempted to
delete the existing vocabulary around blockchain technology and start
over, unencumbered by its "unnecessary confusion."8 6
IV

The Mutable Meaning of "Immutable"

In this section, I focus on a single term associated with
blockchain technology-immutable-to provide but one example of
how differing understandings of what is said to be a key attribute of
the technology could impact regulators' (and others') assessments of
the risks posed by the technology. "Immutable" (and its variations,
e.g., "immutability") is an omnipresent term in describing blockchain
technology. The most downloaded paper on blockchain technology in
the open-access repository SSRN (with more than 6,500 downloads),
Marc Pilkington's Blockchain Technology: Principles and
Applications, states, "Immutability is a characteristic of blockchain
technology." 7 "Immutable" appears in vanous forms in the World
Economic Forum's 2016 report on blockchain technology's role in

sion regulators, as part of efforts to simplify the compliance burdens of virtual currency businesses that operate across the United States. See Jeny Brito
& Peter Van Valkenburgh, State DigitalCurrencyPrinciplesand Framework,
COIN CENTER (Mar. 8, 2017), https://coincenter.org/files/2017-03/statevirtualcurrencyprinciplesandframeworkv2.0.pdf [https://penna.cc/6DCB-549M].
85 See Burk, supra note 63 (noting that perverse innovation can be beneficial
in certain respects, as well).
86 Holmes, supra note 4, at 497 (discussing how eliminating certain terms
could lessen confusion in the legal lexicon).
87 Pilkington, supra note 35, at
15.
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future financial infrastructures;" Don and Alex Tapscotts' popular
book on blockchain technology with glowing blurbs from a Nobel
Prize winner, prominent Chief Executive Officers, and renowned
academics;8 9 and a 2016 Federal Reserve discussion paper,9 0
among countless other sources. Synonyms of "immutable," such as
"permanent," "indelible," or "unchangeable," similarly appear often.
As I have discussed elsewhere, the attribute of immutability
is one of the primary selling features of blockchain technology.9 1
Blockchain technology is at heart a record-keeping technology, and it
purports to enable the creation of permanent, unchangeable records.9 2
See e.g., WORLD EcON. FORUM, supra note 12, at 21 (discussing distributed
ledger technology's ability to deliver "faster and more accurate reporting by
automating compliance processes that draw on immutable data sources"); id.
at 25 ("DLT provides transaction immutability, which is a key requirement
for eliminating the need for an enforcer of trust in the ecosystem."); id. at 43
("Storing financial information on the ledger provides immutable, real-time
updates and facilitates automated review."); id. at 55 ("Reduced fraud: transparent and immutable data on DLT can reduce fraudulent transactions to a
fraction of what they are today.") (emphasis added throughout).
89 See, e.g., TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 9, at 66 ("immutable time
stamps"), 78 ("is an immutable record of everything truly desirable?"); id.
at 81 ("Because the blockchain records and stores all transactions in an immutable record.") (emphasis added throughout). BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION
contains plaudits from Hernando de Soto, a Nobel Prize winner in Economics; the CEOs of Royal Bank of Canada, Digital Asset Holdings, Siemens
USA, SAP SE, Breyer Capital, Seagate Technology, Tata Consultancy Services, Cognizant, OgilvyOne Worldwide, and Unilever; and academics from
MIT and Harvard Law School. Id. at unnumbered pages prior to Table of
Contents.
9o See David Mills et al., Fed. Reserve Bd., Distributed ledger technology in
payments, clearing, and settlements (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Paper 2016095, 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/
2016095pap.pdf [https://penna.cc/CGB5-5PJR].
91 Walch, supra note 79, at 2-5; see also BLOCKCHAIN AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION, supra note 35, at 8.
92 But see Victoria L. Lemieux, In Blockchain We Trust? Blockchain Technology for Identity Management and Privacy Protection, in CEDEM17:
88

PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR E-DEMOCRACY AND OPEN

57, 60-61 (Peter Parycek & Noella Edelman eds. 2017), http://
www.donau-uni.ac.at/imperia/md/content/department/gpa/zeg/bilder/cedem/
cedeml7/cedeml7_proceedings donau universit t edition.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/46D3-WKKK] (noting that "the persistence of entire blockchain
GOVERNMENT
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This is said to be unlike anything seen before, and the power to create
certainty and permanency in records theoretically enables changes to
virtually every social system that we have, as all rely to some extent
on keeping track of things in a reliable and trusted way.9 3 This is why
so many see potential for blockchain technology to change systems
including voting, government benefits, health records, insurance,
and property records, among countless others. With certainty and
permanence in our records, no one can cheat anymore, because
cheating can always be called out with reliable records, and risks
can be assessed more accurately across the board. Certainty and
permanence are indeed potent tools, and if we have finally found these
with blockchain technology, then it is small wonder that so many are
celebrating.
But, are we sure that we have found this certainty and
permanency-this immutability? Or are we using, perhaps, the wrong
wordattimes, and in doing so, potentially overstating what is said to be
one of the technology's most prized and transformative capabilities?9 4
I raise the issue because there appears to be a haze of confusion
around the term, which is troubling, given that immutability is perhaps
the most fundamental attribute of blockchain technology that is said
to make it revolutionary. There are two conceptual problems with
networks is not guaranteed," and exploring issues this raises for record keeping done through blockchain technology).
93 Cf Christian Catalini & Joshua Gans, Some Simple Economics ofthe Blockchain (MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 5191-16, 2016), https://ssm.com/abstract=2874598 [https://penna.cc/U9TD-Z3GB] (describing the benefits possible due to the Bitcoin blockchain's "distributed, costless verification" and
categorizing blockchain technology as a "general purpose technology" due to
its ability to reshape multiple industries).
9 See Gideon Greenspan, The Blockchain Immutability Myth, CoINDESK,
(May 9, 2017), http://www.coindesk.com/blockchain-immutability-myth/
[https://penna.cc/8ZBM-PFXW] ("In blockchains, there is no such thing as
perfect immutability"). Cf Noah Smith, Statistical Significance Is Overrated, BLOOMBERG: VIEW, (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/
articles/2017-04-13/statistical-significance-is-overrated
[https://penna.cc/
RK7J-QQRW] (arguing that the term "statistically significant" is often misinterpreted as meaning 'important' rather than 'noticeable' and discussing
problems caused by this misunderstanding); Campbell Harvey et al., Separating investment facts from flukes, OUPBLOG, (Jan. 8, 2016), https://blog.
oup.com/2016/01/investment-facts-from-flukes/?src=homepage [https://perma.cc/9WPL-NP68].
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the use of the term "immutable" around blockchain technology at
the moment. First, if one uses "immutable" according to its basic
dictionary definition-"not capable of or susceptible to change"95
then real world events involving the two most prominent blockchains
have demonstrated the word "immutable" to be an inapt descriptor, as
both Bitcoin and Ethereum have been rolled back and revised during
their existence.9 6 Second, the word "immutable" (or synonyms such as
permanent, indelible, and unchangeable) is generally used to describe
all variations of blockchain technology, yet there is debate over what
creates a blockchain record's immutability, and it is therefore unclear
whether all variations of the technology share this emergent property.
I explore each of these problems in turn.
The first conceptual problem is that it is misleading to
continue to state that "[i]mmutability is a characteristic of blockchain
technology"9 7 when the records created by both Bitcoin and Ethereum
have each been changed at various times, and when they remain
subject to 51 percent attacks. Bitcoin's blockchain forked into two
separate ledgers in March 2013, requining certain miners (i.e.,
transaction processors of the network) to agree to move from one
ledger to the other to reunite in a single ledger.98 These miners were
creating legitimate records (according to the software protocol's rules)
on the ledger they were working on, but agreed with the developers to
abandon that record to allow Bitcoin to continue as a single record.99
Thus, the abandoned ledger did not remain permanent or indelible, as
those involved agreed to treat it as illegitimate. An even more dramatic
demonstration that blockchain records can change occurred in July
2016 when the Ethereum blockchain rolled back its "immutable"
ledger to erase atheft of Ether, the currency ofthat system.100 The result
1 Immutable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/immutable [https://penna.cc/9VKK-4BGA].
96 See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (explaining the changes
to
Bitcoin and Ethereum).
9 Pilkington, supra note 35, at 15.

See Angela Walch, The BitcoinBlockchain as FinancialMarketInfrastructure: A Considerationof OperationalRisk, 18 N.YU. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y
98

866, 873 (discussing Bitcoin's March 2013 hard fork and how developers and
miners fixed it).
9 See id.
"0 See Kevin D. Werbach, Trustless Trust 66-68, (Aug. 14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssm.com/abstract=2844409 [https://pena.cc/
G8RC-9CM7] (providing a succinct overview of the events surrounding the
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of Ethereum revising its ledger was that the network split in two, as
one contingent used the revised record, while another continued using
the original record. 1 ' These real world events in public blockchains
demonstrate at a minimum that it is problematic to describe blockchain
technology as a whole as immutable, when at least some (and perhaps
all?) blockchain records may be changed if the people operating the
blockchain so choose. To put it bluntly, people can always agree to
override the technology.
This chance of changing Bitcoin's and Ethereum's records
has always been acknowledged in theory, as the discussion around
these systems conceded the possibility of a 51 percent attack on the
networks. 10 2 A 51 percent attack could occur if a party or colluding
group controlled at least 51 percent of the computing power of the
network, allowing them to determine what is recorded to the network's
records, and potentially to revise the existing record. 10 3 For a variety
of reasons, many consider the risk of a successful 51 percent attack to
be essentially zero, but others see it as more uncertain.10 Describing
the records of public blockchains as "immutable" embeds a single risk
assessment (zero chance) into the adjective describing the blockchain,
similar to how mortgage-backed securities carried the adjective of
"AAA.""o This (over)simplification in the general way of talking
about blockchain technology means that people have to fight through
the information barrier created by the use of the term "immutable"
to get to the truth, when there is little reason for them to understand
"immutable" as having any meaning other than its standard one as
"unchangeable."
Even prominent Bitcoin advocate Andreas Antonopoulos
has described Bitcoin as hard to change, rather than absolutely
unchangeable. 10 6 He still refers to Bitcoin's blockchain as immutable,
July 2016 Ethereum hard fork).
101 See id.

See generally Walch, supra note 98.
See Walch, supra note 98, at 861-63 (describing Bitcoin's 51 percent attack risk and exploring reasons the risk is often dismissed).
102
103

10'
15

See id.

See generally Brent J. Horton, Toward a More Perfect Substitute: How
Pressure on the Issuers of Private-LabelMortgage-BackedSecurities Can
Improve the Accuracy of Ratings, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1905 (2013) (discussing
how the AAA ratings attached to mortgage-backed securities shaped investors' perceptions of risk in the run-up to the 2008 Financial Crisis).
106 See Andreas Antonopolous, The Monument oflmmutability, at the Silicon
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however, because he says it represents the closest humanity has come
to creating something truly immutable, and anything easier to change
than Bitcoin has no claim to the word immutable. 10 7 This convoluted
justification for continuing to use the word "immutable" to describe
Bitcoin's blockchain from a prominent figure in the blockchain
community creates confusion because the hidden meaning for
immutable ("hard to change") does not match the general understanding
of the word immutable ("unchangeable"). The secret meaning of
"hard to change" does not seem to have reached the academics,
consultants, thought leaders,"o' and regulators who continue to state
without qualification that blockchain technology creates immutable,
permanent, unchangeable, indelible records.1 0 9 This communication
Valley Bitcoin Meetup, YouTUBE (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=hlSHF3YPijM [https://penna.cc/KP6Z-XD28] (commenting that
immutability is a "tricky concept because it doesn't really exist").
17 See id.
108 I use Daniel Drezner's definition of "thought leader" in this article. See
Daniel W. Drezner, Triumph of the Thought Leader... and the Eclipse of the
Public Intellectual, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.
chronicle.com/article/Triumph-of-the-Thought-Leader/239691
[https://perma.cc/97LQ-V2EW] ("A Thought Leader is an intellectual evangelist. They
develop their own singular lens to explain the world, and then proselytize to
anyone within earshot."). Drezner contrasts thought leaders with public intellectuals, which he defines as "experts, often academics, who are well versed
and well trained enough to comment on a wide range of issues." Drezner
categorizes public intellectuals as "skeptics" and thought leaders as "true believers." Id. Drezner's newly-released book explores this phenomenon, its
causes and implications in more depth. DANIEL W. DREZNER, THE IDEAS INDUSTRY (2017).
109 This is not a universal problem, as some commentators are careful to note
that the immutability of blockchains is not absolute. See, e.g., Greenspan,
supra note 94 ("In blockchains, there is no such thing as perfect immutability"); Werbach, supra note 100, at 41 ("On the blockchain . . it is impossible
to alter a recorded value if the system isfunctioning as intended.") (emphasis
added); id. at 42 ("Blockchain trust is immutable in a probabilistic sense");
Dave Birch, Mutable & Immutable Blockchains, CONSULT HYPERION (Sept.
26,
2016),
http://www.chyp.com/mutable-and-immutable-blockchains/
[https://pena.cc/P7J8-UL9C] (describing "immutable" in the context of
the Bitcoin blockchain as "theoretically mutable but not mutable under any
practical circumstances that we can envisage"); Jameson Lopp, Bitcoin: The
TrustAnchor in a Sea ofBlockchains, CoINDESK (July 23, 2016), http://www.
coindesk.com/bitcoin-the-trust-anchor-in-a-sea-of-blockchains/ [https://per-
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failure creates an asymmetry of information between those who know
the actual capabilities of the technology and those who don't, enabling
the possibility of a "market for lemons"110 as well as the risk that
blockchain technology will be used in areas for which it is ill-suited.
The second conceptual problem with the use of "immutable"
is that it is generally used to describe "blockchain technology"
or "DLT" as a whole, when there are numerous variations in the
technologies and practices that arguably fall into these buckets, and
it is currently unclear which, if any, of the variations may be fairly
described as immutable. At base, this is a problem of describing an
emergent property of a complex system... as if it exists regardless of
what changes one makes to the underlying system. This is problematic
with blockchain technology because, as I discuss below, there is
disagreement about what gives rise to immutability. If we don't know
what creates the immutability, then it is hard to predict how tweaking
different features of the system will affect immutability, and whether it
would be accurate to describe a given variety of blockchain technology
as creating an immutable record.
An analogy may help to clarify what I mean. A cake that is
moist is highly prized, but baking a cake that actually turns out moist
is not a simple task. Quite a few factors affect whether a cake turns
out moist, including "the ingredients used, the method of preparation,
and the baking time and temperature." 11 2 If you leave oil or butter
out of your recipe, for example, or if you bake a cake at too high
a temperature, or for too long, the result is not a moist cake. The
moistness of a cake is a property that is created by a combination of
ma.cc/9PHF-2H2D] ("When we describe a blockchain as 'immutable', we
are broadly claiming that there is a guarantee that the contents will never be
changed. However, from a machine consensus standpoint this is a probabilistic guarantee that can never reach 100%. From a social standpoint, we can
only gauge a blockchain's immutability by its history and make an educated
guess about its future based upon the values held by its community.").

&

no See generally George Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcON. 488 (1970).
"I See Christopher W. Johnson, What are Emergent Properties and How do
They Affect the Engineeringof Complex Systems?, 91 RELIABILITY ENG'G
Sys. SAFETY 1475, 1475-81 (2006) (providing a history of theories of emer-

gent properties of complex systems).
112

How to Make a Moist Cake,

BETTER

HoMiEs & GARDENS, http://www.bhg.

com/recipes/how-to/bake/how-to-make-a-moist-cake/
SK4C-FWC8].

[https://penna.cc/
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ingredients and actions-it is an emergent property of the complex
system that is the baking process.
Similarly, immutability, or at least being "hard to change," is
a much-desired emergent property of certain blockchain systems. But
the active debate on what creates immutability in blockchain systems
shows that there is not yet consensus on this point. For instance, some
argue that immutability comes from the proof of work consensus
mechanism that is used in the Bitcoin network to maintain the record. 113
Others say that immutability comes from the cryptography (i.e., the
hashing process).114 Still others say it comes from chaining "blocks"
of transactions together so that any changes will be evident." The one
certain thing here is that immutability's source remains in dispute.
This is important, given that there are so many variations
to the features of systems that are being created under the heading
of blockchain technology or DLT. 1 16 Some systems allow anyone to
be part of the transaction validation network, while others limit the
group to certain trusted parties.
Some systems use proof of work,
while others use proof of stake, or a variety of other consensus
mechanisms.' Further, a variety of cryptographic techniques are
used,119 and systems vary on whether they make the entire ledger
113

See Antonopoulos, supra note 106; Felipe de Oliveira Simoyama et al.,

Triple entry ledgers with blockchain for auditing, INT. J.

AUDITING TECH.

(forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 11) (on file with author) ("The proof of
work concept is an important feature of bitcoin, since it is what provides for
immutability of records and timestamps.").
"I See Lewis, supra note 23 ("With respect to immutability, there are two
key ideas that help to make tampering easy to detect: hashes and blocks . .
A hash function is a type of mathematical function which turns data into a
fingerprint of that data called a hash").
"' See id.

See generally GEORGE

&

KPMG CONSENSUS: IM(2016), https://assets.kpmg.
com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2016/06/kpmg-blockchain-consensus-mechanism.pdf [https://pena.cc/w9bs-235j] (providing a survey of the variety of
consensus mechanisms used by different forms of blockchain technology).
116

SAMMAN

SIGRID SEIBOLD,

MUTABLE AGREEMENT FOR THE INTERNET OF VALUE

"1 See id. at 15.
11' See generally id.
"1 See Joseph Chow, Blockchain Underpinnings:Hashing, MEDIUM:

CONSEN-

Sys (Jan. 13, 2016), https://medium.com/@ConsenSys/blockchain-underpinnings-hashing-7f4746cbd66b [https://pena.cc/9hs3-3mkb], (describing the
role cryptographic hashing plays in blockchain technology, and the hashing
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publicly viewable (e.g., Bitcoin) or limit visibility of the relevant
entries to the parties involved (e.g., R3's Corda). 120 All of these are
potentially significant changes that could affect the immutability of
the resulting record, much like substituting artificial butter spray could
affect the moistness of a cake whose recipe called for pure butter.
Indeed, "when blockchain technology is adapted from permissionless
environments to permissioned environments the immutability of
blockchain becomes questionable." 1 21 Despite this complexity and
uncertainty, the bulk of the discourse around blockchain technology
states simply that "immutability is a characteristic of blockchain
technology." 1 2 2 While it is possible that any variety of the technology
could yield the emergent property of immutability, this seems highly
unlikely, and is definitely not yet firmly established.
Why is it important for regulators to be aware of this confusion?
Because in the current overheated atmosphere of blockchain euphoria,
some are already taking regulatory actions related to blockchain
technology (perhaps to protect it or promote its use) and are potentially
acting based on poor understanding, baking confusion into the law
they are creating. For instance, in February 2017, the Arizona state
legislature passed a statute defining signatures "secured through a
blockchain" as "electronic signatures," 1 2 3 and providing that "smart
contracts may exist in commerce ."124 The statute defines "blockchain
functions used by different systems).
120 See Richard Gendal Brown et al., R3, Corda: An Introduction 8
(Aug.
2016),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55f73743e4b05lcfccOb02cf/t/5 7bda2fdebbdlacc9cO309b2/1472045822585/corda-introductory-whitepaper-final.pdf [https://penna.cc/buq5-ssg2] ("[I]n our model, it is
not the case that transactions and ledger entries are globally visible. In cases
where transactions only involve a small subgroup of parties we strive to keep
the relevant data purely within that subgroup.").
121 Nitesh Emmadi & Harika Narumanchi, Reinforcing Immutability of Permissioned Blockchains with Keyless Signatures'Infrastructure,in INTERNA-

1-2
(describing how immutability of the ledger cannot be guaranteed in permissioned blockchains and proposing remedies to guarantee immutability in permissioned settings).
122 Pilkington, supra note 35, at
15.
123 Act of Sept. 21, 2006, ch. 26, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7003 (2006)
(amended by 2017 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2417), https://legiscan.com/AZ/text/
HB2417/id/1528949 [https://penna.cc/RB8T-4EZP].
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON DISTRIBUTED COMPUTING AND NETWORKING (2017)

124

Id.
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technology" as "distributed ledger technology that uses a distributed,
decentralized, shared and replicated ledger, which may be public
or private, permissioned or permissionless, or driven by tokenized
crypto economics or tokenless." It further states that "[t]he data on the
ledger is protected with cryptography, is immutable and auditable and
provides an uncensored truth."125
Although there are numerous problems with this definition, 12 6
I will limit my critique here to the use of "immutable." First, stating
that "the data on the ledger is .

.

. immutable" in a statute does not

mean that the data is immutable (i.e., unchangeable) in reality. Does
the statute mean that courts should treat data on a blockchain, public
or private, as if it is immutable, even if it is empirically demonstrated
that it is not? As discussed, it is clear from events like the July 2016
Ethereum hard fork that blockchain records are vulnerable to changes
through social consensus (i.e., the people who are part of the relevant
blockchain system can choose to alter the record). 1 2 7 Using the word
"immutable" in the definition of "blockchain technology" ends up
being nonsensical and confusing, particularly since the legislation
was both proposed and enacted after the July 2016 Ethereum hard
fork. If the legislators intended "immutable" to mean something other
than "unchanging" or "unchangeable," then they needed to define it
that way (though it is poor drafting as a rule to assign non-intuitive
meanings to defined terms in statutes and contracts).
Second, the definition states that data on both private and
public, permissioned and permissionless, ledgers is immutable. 128
Despite the fact that it is unresolved whether different variations of
blockchain technology give rise to immutable records, the statute
explicitly treats public and private ledgers as if they have identical
capabilities. Does the statute suggest that data on private blockchains
should be treated as immutable, even if these ledgers have a much
weaker claim to this property? Again, the definition of blockchain
H.B. 2417, 53rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017) (emphasis added) (explaining the Arizona legislature's definition of the blockchain).
126 For instance, stating "the data on the ledger . .
provides an uncensored
truth" is hugely problematic. The data on a blockchain ledger is not necessarily true, as there can be errors or fraud involved in its entry. The truth of
the data appearing on a blockchain is dependent on processes outside the
technology itself.
127 See Werbach, supra note 100, at
67.
128 H.B. 2417, 53rd Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017).
125
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technology here may not comport with reality, which is generally
understood to be a bad idea for a law.
The problems with the Arizona statute suggest that the
lawmakers involved were legislating without an understanding of
blockchain technology, and that they failed to critically analyze
the subject they were dealing with. Embedding confusion and
misunderstandings in law is a serious problem, and demonstrates just
how vital it is that regulators fight through the terminology issues and
hype around blockchain technology as they evaluate how to treat it.
Moreover, as regulators are evaluating the technology for use in the
burgeoning "regtech" space1 29 and in government record-keeping of all
kinds, it is critical that regulators understand the actualcapabilities of
the technology. The problematic usage of the term "immutable" makes
it difficult to determine and evaluate the capabilities of blockchain
technology, and is just one example of how terminology problems can
prevent regulators from making the best decisions.
The term "immutable," with its varying and sometimes nonintuitive meanings in describing blockchain technology, is one that I
very much wish we could strike from the blockchain lexicon, as "by
ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we should gain very
much in the clearness of our thought." 1 3 0
V

Mitigation Strategies

Given the fluctuating and contested vocabulary of the
blockchain technology space, what can regulators do to minimize
the problematic terminology's impact on their actions? In this Part
V, I offer some suggestions, tempered by the understanding that the
problems of unsettled terminology cannot be completely resolved.
These suggestions deal with regulators' approach to ensuring they

RegTech envisions using blockchain technology or DLT as a way to facilitate regulatory compliance by regulated parties, and potentially to allow the
regulator a real-time view of the relevant activities of regulated parties. See
generallyVeele Colaert, RegTech as a Response to Regulatory Expansion in
the Financial Sector (Mar. 17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.
ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2677116
[https://pena.cc/7RQHKZK9] (providing an overview of the risks and benefits of RegTech, which
Colaert defines as ""the use of technological solutions to facilitate compliance with and monitoring of regulatory requirements.").
130 Holmes, supra note 4, at 464.
129
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understand the facts about the technology, as well as its risks and
benefits; I do not propose particular regulatory actions or strategies.
These mitigation suggestions include various ways regulators
can educate themselves about the technology, and crucially, the mindset
and critical perspective they should assume in the education process.
Over the past several years, regulators and international organizations
have been actively working to learn about blockchain technology, so
I do not mean to suggest that the education process has not begun. 1 3 1 1
do argue, however, that it remains incomplete.
A.

Learn Everything About Blockchain Technology

Regulators must work to educate themselves about blockchain
technology, so that their understanding of the technology is less
affected by vocabulary problems. If regulators are well educated,
they will be alert to sometimes over-inclusive or under-inclusive
terminology and subtle but consequential distinctions between
variants of the technology, and able to respond to these nuances in
their analyses. 132 Below, I suggest actions regulators can take to learn
the facts about blockchain technology, many of which are already
being taken. These actions, however, should go hand-in-hand with the
mindset described in Part V.B. to help fight through the terminology
problems that permeate the blockchain discourse.
1.

Cultivate Expertise

To become better educated, regulators can seek advice from
outside experts, including consulting firms, academics, or companies
operating in the industry. Regulators and legislative bodies such as
Congressional committees and the European Parliament have done

See infra Part VA. for examples of education efforts regulators have already undertaken or are currently involved in.
132 See Crosman, supra note 64; Fenwick et al., supra note 9 (arguing
that
regulation functions best when regulators develop a holistic understanding of
the subject they seek to regulate).
131
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this by holding hearings, 1 3 3 convening conferences or workshops, 1 3 4
seeking public comment, 1 35 creating advisory boards, 13 6 and inviting
speakers to address their members. 13 7 Regulators have also been
experimenting with blockchain technology to better understand it,
often partnering with industry in these endeavors. 1 38
See, e.g., Beyond Silk Road: PotentialRisks, Threats, and Promises of
Virtual Currency: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 5 (2013); Hearing at the Economic Committee of the European Parliamenton Virtual Currencies (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/events-hearings.html?id=20160125CHE00081 [https://pena.cc/4GBH-PJE8].
134 See, e.g., SEC Fintech Forum, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://
www.sec.gov/spotlight/fintech [https://pena.cc/L8U4-DWU9].
135 See, e.g., Discussionpaperon distributedledger technology (Fin. Conduct
Auth., Discussion Paper DP17/3, 2017), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/
discussion/dpl7-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/47KH-J579] (seeking input from
the public on DLT risks, opportunities, and regulatory challenges).
136 See,
e.g., Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Managing Director Welcomes Establishment of High Level Advisory Group on FinTech (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/03/15/
prl784-imf-managing-director-welcomes-establishment-of-high-level-advisory-group-on-fintech [https://perma.cc/YCN5-U27A] (reporting the creation of an advisory group to advise the International Monetary Fund on fintech issues).
137 See, e.g., Chamber ofDigital Commerce Gathers at FederalReserve AnnualMeeting to DiscussBlockchain Technology, YAHOo! FIN. (June 6, 2016),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/chamber-digital-commerce-gathers-federal-211345230.html [https://pena.cc/GX5Q-HT6F] (reporting on presentations on blockchain technology by representatives of blockchain companies
and the Chamber of Digital Commerce to governors of ninety central banks
at the U.S. Federal Reserve); Don Tapscott, CEO, Tapscott Grp. Inc., Address
at IMF Annual Meeting (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.imf.org/extemal/mmedia/
view.aspx?vid=516005915600 1[https://perma.cc/7DSP-GMVV].
138 See, e.g., Ian Allison, Bank of England & China Merchants Bank Join
Hyperledger Project, INT'L Bus. TiEs (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/bank-england-china-merchants-bank-j oin-hyperledger-proj
ect-1609011 [https://perma.cc/ZA7T-JC8P] (reporting that the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank of Bostonjoined the Hyperledger project,
a consortium developing open source blockchain technology software); Rod
Garratt, CAD-Coin versus Fedcoin, R3 (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.finextra.
com/finextra-downloads/newsdocs/cad-coin-versus.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
V67X-Y8SC] (discussing Project Jasper, the Bank of Canada's distributed
ledger technology experimental payments collaboration with R3 and other
-
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Self-education is also a possibility. In this scenario, teams
within different regulators can work to become internal experts on
the technology. Indeed, this has been the case with many regulators,
with many creating a "blockchain" or "DLT" internal team to steer
knowledge and experimentation. 139 However, the multidisciplinary
nature of the technology makes its mastery challenging, as deeply
understanding the technology requires knowledge of fields including,
among many others, economics, computer science, law, finance, and
cryptography.
To help remedy the expertise problem, regulators can also hire
internal experts, bringing expertise in-house. This could be difficult
with blockchain technology, however, as developers with experience
in the area are in great demand, and regulators may be unable to
compete with high private sector compensation. 140 Further, there are
frequent reports that the number of people with true expertise in the
topic is extremely limited.1 4 1
partners); FintechAccelerator Proofof Concept: PwC- DistributedLedger
Technology, BANK OF ENG. (June 17, 2016), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/

Documents/fintech/pwcpoc.pdf [https://penna.cc/8HFY-UGLV] (reporting
on the Bank of England's proof of concept work with consulting /accounting
firm PwC on distributed ledger technology).
139 See, e.g., Stan Higgins, EU ParliamentRep Seeks 61 million for Blockchain Research, CoiNDESK (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/eu-

parliament-member-seeks-el -million-blockchain-research/ [https://penna.
cc/GK35-VTH7] (reporting on funding request for distributed ledger technology task force previously approved by European Parliament); EUROPEAN
CENT. BANK

&

TARGET

2

SEC., TERMS OF REFERENCE: TASK FORCE ON DISTRIBUT-

(Aug. 16, 2016), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/
initiatives/shared/docs/dlttaskforcemandate.pdf [https://penna.cc/M2F7ED LEDGER TECHNOLOGIES

YB8Z] (discussing a task force created by the European Central Bank to
explore the implications of distributed ledger technologies).
14
See Kim S. Nash, Blockchain Experts, a Rare Breed, May Demand
Big Bucks, WALL ST. J.: CIO J. (May 12, 2016), https://blogs.wsj.com/

cio/2016/05/12/blockchain-experts-a-rare-breed-may-demand-big-bucks/
[https://penna.cc/92KS-DFGN] (reporting that different Wall Street firms are
paying $250,000 annual salaries for blockchain engineers).
"' See Michael del Castillo, The Lack of Blockchain Talent is Becoming
an Industry Concern, CoINDESK (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.coindesk.com/

blockchain-hiring-difficulties-becoming-industry-concern/
[https://perma.
cc/Y3SA-KMFG] ("The alleged lack of available talent for blockchain industry jobs was high on the agenda at the DTCC's Fintech Symposium, held
. . in New York City yesterday."); Michael Scott, The Blockchain Devel-
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2.

Consult with Other Regulators across
Jurisdictions and Subject Domains

Given the potential for regulators to understand blockchain
technology differently because of the divergent language around
it, regulators from different jurisdictions and subject matters
should communicate with one another about their understandings.
Communication can help to flush out misunderstandings, and there are
many examples of these collaborations occurring already. 142 However,
discussions and collaborations can also spread misinformation and
misunderstandings, and generate herding behavior as regulators
compete to appear as innovation-friendly as others to avoid stifling
job creation in their jurisdictions.
3.

Follow Activity by Standards
Organizations and Academia

Standards bodies such as the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) and the United Nations' International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) play an important role in
streamlining terminology and other common practices across a field or
technology. These bodies, along with the Intemet-focused W3C, have
begun to look at blockchain technology, and have formed working
groups to determine where and when standards may be appropriate. 143
oper Shortage: Emerging Trends & Perspectives, BITCOIN

31,

2016),

MAGAZINE

(Oct.

https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/the-blockchain-develop-

.

er-shortage-emerging-trends-and-perspectives-1477930838/ [https://perma.
cc/HJ5W-F8MVD] ("Amid the steady rise of blockchain innovation, there are
growing concerns about a looming shortage of qualified developers.")
142 See, e.g., Discussionpaper on distributed ledger technology, supra note
135, at 8 (referring to collaboration to learn about distributed ledger technology between the U.K.'s Financial Conduct Authority and the European Securities & Markets Authority, as well as in IOSCO and the Financial Stability Board); ECB, Bank ofJapan Partnerfor DistributedLedger Technology

Research, BBR

INTERMEDIARIES

ECN & EXCHANGE (Dec. 7, 2016), http://ec-

nandexchanges.banking-business-review.com/news/ecb-bank-of-japan-partner-for-distributed-ledger-technology-research-071216-5689953
[https://
perma.cc/4BKY-ZE3E].
143

See Blockchain Community Group, W3C

COMMUNITY

& Bus.

GROUPS,

https://www.w3.org/community/blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/4A4M-J8ZK]
(listing blog posts from the online W3C Blockchain Community Group, the
Internet's informal blockchain governing body); Stan Higgins, Australia to
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These initiatives stimulate potentially affected parties to join the
conversation, with the goal of shaping useful standards.' Regulators
should closely follow the work of standards bodies, but should also
keep in mind that the organizations themselves are not immune to
politics among groups with diverging interests.1 4 5
Additionally, there is an initiative at the University of British
Columbia's blockchain technology research center (Blockchain@
UBC) to create a glossary of terminology around blockchain

Lead InternationalBlockchain StandardsEffort, CoINDESK (Sept. 15, 2016),
http://www.coindesk.com/australia-lead-international-blockchain-standards-effort/http://www.coindesk.comaustralia-lead-international-blockchain-standards-effortlhttp ://www. coindesk. com/australia-lead-international-blockchain-standards-effort/ [https://pena.cc/H6WT-6HP6] (reporting
that Australia will manage the international technical committee for the
development of blockchain standards for the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO), including standards for tenninology); Media Release,
Standards Austl., Austl. to Lead Int'l Blockchain Standards Comm. (Sept.
15, 2016), http://www.standards.org.au/OurOrganisation/News/Documents/
Australia%/o20to%20lead%20international%20blockchaino20standards%20
committee.pdf) [https://perma.cc/4LAV-NTLU] ("Joining Australia on the
technical committee are 35 ISO member bodies including Germany, USA,
Canada, Estonia, France, Japan, UK, and Korea."); Bailey Reutzel, At W3C
Event, Industry Seeks to Weave Blockchains into New Web, CoiNDESK (July
15, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/w3c-events-industry-begins-long-roadblockchain-standards/ [https://perma.cc/N7M2-2X8Y] (discussing W3C's
role in developing international blockchain standards); Workshop on Security Aspects of Blockchain, INT'L TELECOMM. UNION (Mar. 21, 2017), http://
www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/Workshops-and-Seminars/201703/Pages/default.aspx
[https://perma.cc/P7KP-GGTY] (providing coverage of the ITU workshop
on blockchains and security).
...
See Blockchain Community Group, supra note 143 (including online posts
from blockchain users about developing appropriate international standards).
"I See CRAIG N. MURPHY & JoANNE YATES, THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
FOR STANDARDIZATION: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THROUGH VOLUNTARY CONSENSUS

26-45 (2009) (explaining the difficulties involved in achieving consensus
when disagreements exist both within and across groups); J.M. Porup, A battle ragesfor the future of the Web, ARs TECHNICA UK (Feb. 13, 2017), https://
arstechnica.co.uk/infonation-technology/2017/02/future-of-the-www-timbl-drm/ [https://perma.cc/P8GF-RBEP] (describing the heated battle over
Digital Rights Management (DRM) standards in W3C, the Internet's informal governing body).
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and regulators may want to build from projects like

4.

Watch and Learn: Buy Time Until the
Language and Technology Stabilize

Time and continued experimentation with blockchain
technology will hopefully lead to a more unified and stable terminology,
which will make the technology easier to understand, and therefore
regulate. A strategy of waiting for a stable terminology is in tension
with consumer protection and financial and social stability regulatory
goals, so regulators should look for creative ways to achieve their core
missions while giving the technology a chance to evolve and stabilize.
This will be difficult due to the rush to incorporate blockchain
technology into numerous critical social practices and key parts of
the financial system.147 Notably, the Depository Trust and Clearing
Company (DTCC) announced in January 2017 that it was putting
derivatives on a blockchain (or distributed ledger, or who knows).1 4 8
Industry may not wait until a stable technology or terminology emerges
before using the technology in important ways, 1 49 so consumers and
financial stability may be put at risk before the technology or its
vocabulary gets nailed down."o
Regulators around the globe have been looking for creative
ways to enable safe technological experimentation in "fintech"
146

See

VICTORIA L. LEMIEUX, SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES RESEARCH

COUNCIL OF CANADA, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY FOR RECORD KEEPING: HELP

app. B (2016), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/VictoriaLemieux/publication/309414363 Blockchain forRecordkeeping Help or
Hype/links/580f539408ae009606bb62f6.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PJC-LA8W]
(providing definitions of key terms associated with blockchain technology
proposed to be incorporated into existing archival InterPARES Trust Tenminology Database).
17 See generally WORLD EcON. FORUM, supra note 12.
148 Nathaniel Popper, Wall Street Clearinghouseto Adopt Bitcoin Technology,
N.Y TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/
business/dealbook/wall-street-clearing-house-to-adopt-bitcoin-technology.
html [https://perma.cc/6YUA-BAHP] (reporting that the DTCC would be
developing a permissioned distributed ledger to manage derivatives trading).
149 See Fenwick et al., supra note 9, at 5.
150 Id. at 9-10 (describing the impossibility of protecting consumers from
'unknown unknowns'-negative externalities associated with new technology that have not yet been discovered).
OR HYPE?
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(including blockchain technology), and the latest trend is to create
"regulatory sandboxes.""1 These safe harbors, which have been
adopted or proposed in a growing number of countries around the
world, allow certain fintech companies to escape regulatory sanction
in their startup phase, while protecting consumers in specified ways. 15 2
Each sandbox is slightly different, and each is in a different phase of
rollout or discussion, 15 3 but the idea seeks to emulate the clinical trials
held for pharmaceuticals in allowing limited "trying out" of financial
technology before making it available to the masses. U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Acting Chair Christopher Giancarlo has
advocated the creation of a regulatory sandbox in the United States
so that it does not lose ground to countries more willing to allow
experimentation with the technology."' And a recent G20 Insights
Paper called for the creation of a global regulatory sandbox to "support
beneficial private sector blockchain development," including for use
in providing financial services to the unbanked and underbanked."
See RegulatorySandbox, FIN. CONDUCT AUTHORITY (May 11, 2015), https://
www.fca.org.uk/finns/project-innovate-innovation-hub/regulatory-sandbox
[https://pena.cc/9ELB-ZJ2B] (compiling relevant information about the
U.K.'s "regulatory sandbox" concept and status launched in 2015 by the Financial Conduct Authority); Will Hallatt et al., Hong Kong Launches Regulatory
Sandbox in Wake ofDevelopments inAustralia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the
UK, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Sept. 30, 2016), http://sites.herbertsmithfree-

hills.vuturevx.com/103/12430/landing-pages/2016.09.30-apac-fintech-briefing.pdf [https://penna.cc/4B4U-MZS4] (providing an overview of regulatory
sandbox initiatives around the world).
152 See Hallatt et al., supra note 151.
153 See id. (describing Singapore's regulatory sandbox); Corey McHattan,
Australia - ASIC Issues "Sandbox" Framework, Including "Fintech Licencing Exemption ", CONVENTUS LAW (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.conventuslaw.

com/report/australia-asic-issues-sandbox-framework-including/ [https://perma.cc/FF9D-EA8S] (describing Australia's regulatory sandbox); Regulatory
Sandbox, supra note 151.
15 See J. Christopher Giancarlo, CFTC
Giancarlo:How US Regulators Can
Boost Blockchain in 2017, CoINDESK (Dec. 16, 2016), http://www.coindesk.

com/cftcs-giancarlo-how-regulators-can-boost-blockchain-2017/
perna.cc/HQ7K-9HZG].

[https://

See Julie Maupin, The G20 Countries Should Engage with Blockchain
Technologies to Build an Inclusive, Transparent, and Accountable Digital
Economy for All, G20 INSIGHTS (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.g20-insights.
15

org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/g20-countries-engage-blockchain-technologies-build-inclusive-transparent-accountable-digital-economy.pdf/ [https://
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While the sandbox approach may be helpful in evaluating
new business models or technologies in a controlled setting, regulators
should be mindful of the limitations of the conclusions they can
draw from the experiments conducted in the sandboxes. While the
sandbox activities may reveal consequences to consumers from a
micro-prudential perspective, they can't reveal the macro-prudential
(systemic) consequences of the activities, because they have not been
tested on a broad scale that would give meaningful indications of how
they would interact with the larger financial system. So, just because a
fintech (or blockchain) company appears to work fine in trial run with
a limited set of consumers does not mean that it has been vetted from
a systemic risk or contagion perspective.
B.

Adopt a Critical Mindset in the Education
Process

In Part V.A, I suggested ways that regulators could learn about
blockchain technology, with the goal of overcoming the vocabulary
problems around it. However, education without the appropriate
mindset is still likely to lead to misunderstandings about the
technology, poor risk assessments of it, and harmful regulatory actions
or omissions. It is essential that regulators do not simply accept what
they read or hear at face value; rather, they must adopt a critical point
of view and act strategically to uncover the facts beneath the muddle
of inconsistent terminology, misinformation, and hype. I offer the
following suggestions to facilitate this critical approach.
1.

Seek to Separate Hype from Reality

First, throughout the education process, regulators must seek
to filter out hype surrounding the technology. Hype can be insidious
and unintentional, based on genuine misunderstandings by those
spreading it, or by a lack of attention to detail. It can also be motivated
by incentives, such as the desire to profit by selling the technology or
oneself as a thought leader.
A contested vocabulary can mask hype, acting almost like
a sleight of hand in a magic trick. As with the use of "immutable,"
imprecise vocabulary usage can suggest that each variation of the
technology has the same fundamental characteristics, when the
characteristics of a given variant may be vastly different from the
perma.cc/RDF6-ESB CI.
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characteristics of other forms of the technology that are also labeled
"blockchain." We see this in references to "the blockchain" in
describing the technology, as if all forms of blockchain technology
were essentially like Bitcoin or Ethereum, when there are extremely
consequential differences amongst the features, which affect the
emergent properties of the varying systems.
Hype and terminology errors can end up in work by legitimate
academics and organizations, and then ripple through the field, making
an imprecise or inaccurate statement hard to remove from discourse,
as other work builds on it and cites it as fact. 15 6 One example of this
phenomenon is the widely stated "fact" in blockchain discussions that
Estonia is using blockchain technology as part of its national digital
identity system, 5 7 when, according to Estonian officials and historic
records, that is untrue." Taking another example, if every early work
states that blockchain technology is "immutable," then works that are
written now will likely also state that it is immutable, relying on the
earlier works, and the overstatement about the technology itself may
become immutable. Thus, regulators should be alert to the potential
for terminology confusion to disguise hype in their quest for the facts
about blockchain technology.
The struggle to root out falsehoods ("fake news") in social media is very
much part of the current zeitgeist in 2017, and the blockchain space is wrestling with this issue as well.
15 See, e.g., Dave Birch, House of Blockchain, CONSULT HYPERION (Dec. 7,
2016), http://www.chyp.com/house-of-blockchain/ [https://penna.cc/FY423ZYQ] (stating that discussion of blockchain technology in United Kingdom's House of Lords included incorrect statements that the Estonian digital
identity system used blockchain technology); Michael Mainelli, Blockchain
Will Help Us Prove OurIdentities in a Digital World, HARv. Bus. REV. (Mar.
16, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/03/blockchain-will-help-us-prove-our-identities-in-a-digital-world [https://perma.cc/VPL5-QKET] (stating that "since
2007 Estonia has been operating a universal national digital identity scheme
using blockchain); Don Tapscott, New Economy Talks with Don Tapscott,
INT'L MONETARY FuND (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.imf.org/external/mmedia/
view. aspx?vid=5160059156001 [https://pena.cc/KW2M-9V8Y] (quoting
Don Tapscott at the 42 minute mark, "Estonia showing the way forward with
the blockchain-based identity").
151 See Dave Birch, Estonia, fake news and digitalidentity, CONSULT HYPERION
(Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.chyp.com/estonia-fake-news-and-digital-identity/ [https://perma.cc/46YA-3YNP] (debunking the "urban legend" that Estonia's digital identity system uses a blockchain).
156
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Consider the Source (and the Source's
Incentives)

In any research project, one must consider the legitimacy of
the source of information, asking, essentially, is this source reliable?
Regulators, in their research on blockchain technology, must do
the same. This evaluation includes ferreting out the incentives that
may shape a source's perspective and advice, and determining how
those incentives affect the source's credibility. As with all industries,
blockchain technology has advocates that lobby for it to be treated
favorably by regulators and widely adopted by parties that include
governments. Over the past several years, lobbying groups (i.e., the
Chamber of Digital Commerce and the Global Blockchain Business
Council),1 5 9 a think tank and advocacy organization with blockchain
industry funding (i.e., Coin Center), 160 and a Congressional Blockchain

1 About Us, CHAMBER OF DIG. COM., http://www.digitalchamber.org/about.
html [https://penna.cc/QKU7-9QDE] ("The Chamber of Digital Commerce
is the world's leading trade association representing the digital asset and
blockchain industry. Our mission is to promote the acceptance and use of
digital assets and blockchain-based technologies. Through education, advocacy, and working closely with policymakers, regulatory agencies and industry, our goal is to develop a pro-growth legal environment that fosters innovation, jobs and investment."); About, GLOBAL BLOCKCHAIN Bus. COUNCIL,
http://gbbcouncil.org/ [https://pena.cc/S2LJ-U385] ("The GBBC educates
business leaders on Blockchain technology, provides a forum for businesses
and technology experts to collaborate on Blockchain-based business solutions, supports businesses interested in implementing Blockchain technology
in their operations and advocates for the global adoption of this transformative technology.")
160 The donors to Coin Center listed on Coin Center's website include venture capital firms with investments in the blockchain technology space (e.g.,
Andreessen Horowitz and Union Square Ventures) and companies in the
blockchain technology space (e.g., Chain, Blockstream, and BitFury). About
Us, COIN CTR., https://coincenter.org/about#supporters [https://perma.cc/
NE2Y-BLN8]; Jerry Brito, Coin Center Raises $1 Million for 2017 Operations, Announces New Supporters, CoIN CTR. (Feb. 21, 2017), https://coincenter.org/entry/coin-center-raises-I-million-for-2017-operations-announces-new-supporters [https://perma.cc/PYB8-JEG2] ("Coin Center is 'the
leading non-profit research and advocacy center focused on the public policy
issues facing cryptocurrency and decentralized computing technologies like
Bitcoin and Ethereum."').
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Caucus focused on pushing the technology forward, have formed. 1 6 1
Regulators must be sensitive to how the goals and incentives of
these parties may shape the information and recommendations they
provide. 1 62 The Chamber of Digital Commerce and Coin Center
have been active in educating regulators and policymakers through
mediums such as conferences, meetings, reports and white papers, opeds, and proposed legislation. 16 3 This is to be expected, but regulators
need to be sure that they factor the interests of these parties into the
weight they give their analyses and advice. 16 4
Regulators are also learning about the technology from
the industry itself-from owners of companies in the blockchain
ecosystem; the software developers and cryptographers building the
systems; consulting firms that have developed blockchain technology
advising practices; and many, many thought leaders-through an
extremely active conference scene1 65 and direct consultation. 1 6 6 This is
appropriate and essential, but again, conflicts of interest must be kept
in mind in evaluating the information provided by these parties. (And
yes, even academics can be conflicted by relationships with industry
Olga Kharif, New CongressionalCaucusSeeks FavorableLawsfor Blockchain, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 26, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-26/new-congressional-caucus-seeks-favorable-laws-for-blockchain [https://perna.cc/K7UL-4GT9] (reporting on the formation of a
congressional caucus by Representatives Mick Mulvaney and Jared Polis "to
advocate for cryptocurrencies and blockchain-based technologies"). Since
Mick Mulvaney became the Director of the Office of Management & Budget
in early 2017 (resigning his Congressional seat), David Schweikert has joined
the Blockchain Caucus. See Neeraj Agrawal, CongressionalBlockchain Caucus Kicks Off COIN CTR. (Feb. 1, 2017), https://coincenter.org/entry/congressional-blockchain-caucus-kicks-off [https://pena.cc/X8G6-X9BY].
162 See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
163 See, e.g., COIN CTR., www.coincenter.org [https://perma.cc/NE2Y-BLN8];
DIG. CHAMBER COM., https://digitalchamber.org [https://perma.cc/PPJ3NJ9Z].
164 See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
165 It is common knowledge in the blockchain community that there are
a prodigious number of conferences, summits, and workshops on blockchain technology and fintech. CoinDesk maintains a partial list of upcoming events at
Bitcoin Events, CoINDESK, http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-events/ [https://
perma.cc/EA7W-MV9W] (showing nine Bitcoin orblockchain events scheduled for May 2017 alone).
166 See generallyPart VA.
161
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or others, a desire for the spotlight, or the source of their research
funding.)
In evaluating a source, one also generally looks for signals
of legitimacy and authority, such as an association with a known and
respected institution. 167 This is complicated in the blockchain space,
however, in part because terminology problems, the complexity of the
technology, and extreme hype have resulted in inaccurate or imprecise
and therefore misleading information appearing in works from
legitimate, authoritative sources. 1 68 So while this is generally a sound
tactic, in blockchain world, the imprimatur of a trusted institution is
not necessarily sufficient to ensure reliable information, making the
other suggestions in this Section V.B more important.
3.

Seek Diverse Perspectives

To uncover the facts about blockchain technology that
are now drowned out by a cacophony of confusing terminology,
regulators should ensure that they seek out and consider a diversity of
perspectives on the technology. By this I mean that they should seek
and consider input from those who view the technology as having
limitless potential, as well as those who are more skeptical; and those
who see few risks to the technology, as well as those who see great
risks; and of course, those who fall somewhere in the middle of these
spectrums. Considering a multiplicity of perspectives can reveal
vocabulary inconsistencies and hype, allowing a more nuanced truth
to emerge and enabling regulators to make better decisions about the
technology. The benefits of including diverse perspectives in decisionmaking are well established. 169
Additional types of diversity can also be helpful. I have
previously called formultiple disciplines to be involved inthe evaluation
and development of blockchain technology, given its foundational and
interdisciplinary nature. 170 Insights about the technology's risks and
167

See generally, Evaluating Sources ofInformation, PURDUE OWL, https://

owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/553/0 1/

[https://pena.cc/K5KB-

TFX5].
168 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 35 (describing blockchain technology as immutable); Mainelli, supra note 157 (stating that Estonia's digital
identity system uses a blockchain).
169 See generally SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE (2008) (exploring how different types of diversity improve problem solving in groups).
17o

See Angela Walch, Blockchain Workshop Position Statement, W3 (June
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benefits can come from any relevant discipline, so regulators cannot
just focus on learning from technical experts. Rather, they must be
alert to and seek input from those in fields such as record keeping,
law, economics, finance, risk and numerous others. This inclusion
of multiple fields is necessary, but poses risks of its own, given the
difficulties of communicating across disciplines mentioned earlier.1 7 1
Gender, ethnic, economic, geographic, and other forms of
diversity are also relevant to this issue. The technology and finance
worlds are known to be dominated by men and to be predominantly
white. 172 This is often the case in the blockchain space as well, as a look

&

30,
2016),
https://www.w3.org/2016/04/blockchain-workshop/interest/
walch.html [https://pena.cc/2DLB-6CA7].
17 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text (discussing "Cross-Field
Communications").
172 See, e.g., DAVID BEEDE ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EcON.
& STATISTICS
ADMIN., ESA ISSUE BRIEF 04-11, WOMEN IN STEM: A GENDER GAP TO INNOVATION 1 (2011), http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/womeninstemagaptoinnovation8311.pdf [https://pena.cc/S9JG-HJ98] ("[W]omen are vastly
underrepresented in STEM jobs and among STEM degree holders despite
making up nearly half of the U.S. workforce and half of the college-educated
workforce."); LIANA CHRISTIN LANDIVAR, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EcON.
STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ACS-24, DISPARITIES IN STEM EMPLOYMENT BY SEX, RACE & HISPANIC ORIGIN 19 (2013), https://www.census.
gov/prod/2013pubs/acs-24.pdf [https://perna.cc/3QUG-B5TX] ("Black and
Hispanic workers are underrepresented in STEM occupations."); SILICON
VALLEY BANK, U.S. STARTUP OUTLOOK 2017 12 (2017), https://www.svb.com/
uploadedFiles/Content/Trends_and Insights/Reports/StartupOutlookReport/US%20Startup%/o200utlook%/`20Report%/`202017.pdf [https://pena.cc/
C2XK-BXJU] ("Women in tech leadership has been a topic of conversation
in Silicon Valley and globally for several years. It is well-known that women
are underrepresented on startup boards and in the executive suite. For all the
work being done to change this ratio in the U.S., this year's survey respondents report there is no progress in the aggregate. Leading into 2017, 70% of
startups report having no women on their boards, and more than half (54%)

have no women in executive positions."); OLIVER WYMAN, WOMEN IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 2016 6 (2016), http://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/
oliver-wyman/global/en/2016/june/WiFS/WomenInFinancialServices_2016.
pdf [https://pena.cc/FR4M-32WK] ("Female representation is growing on
financial services Boards (20 percent in 2016) and Executive Committees (16
percent in 2016), but progress is slow."). See generally, U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-238, DIVERSITY MANAGEMENT: TRENDS AND PRACTICES IN
THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY AND AGENCIES AFTER THE RECENT FINANCIAL
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at most conference panels and advisory boards reveals. 1 73 Including
people from different backgrounds in the discussion can help to bring
different points of view and experiences to the conversation, which
should lead to more fulsome analyses by regulators.
This means that regulators should seek input from experts
other than just those recommended or provided by blockchain industry
groups. Regulators can of course critique and assess the credibility
of industry-provided information, but they should not do so on their
own. What if they miss something? What if they are overpowered by
industry influence? Including parties known for expressing a critical
perspective as advisors can help ensure that regulators are able to
consider a more complete picture. 7 4
4.

Doubt Everything and Trust No One:
Timeo Thought Leaders Et Dona
17
Ferentes"

Regulators should approach their education on blockchain
technology from a skeptical perspective, accepting no claims on
faith. Ideally, they should take this approach to everything they do,
but it is particularly important to do so with emerging technologies
or practices. As discussed in Part III, language problems coupled
with complexity can contribute to regulatory capture and a tendency
among regulators to go along with what industry says because they are
inadequately equipped to question it. 1 7 6 With blockchain technology,
(2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653814.pdf [https://penna.cc/
GC8E-DYYJ] (reporting on the underrepresentation of women and minorities in the financial services industry).
173 See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 136 (listing the fourteen members of
the IMF's High Level Advisory Group on Fintech, two of whom are women);
Consensus 2017 Speakers, CoINDESK, http://www.coindesk.com/events/consensus-2017/speakers/ [https://perna.cc/ZRU6-7P5T] (reflecting that fewer
than 20 percent of the speakers at the premier industry blockchain technology
conference are women).
171 See Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89
N.C. L. REV. 1629 (2011) (proposing the creation of formal "regulatory contrarians" tasked to monitor and critique financial regulators to improve systemic risk oversight by ensuring that contrarian viewpoints are aired).
"7 VIRGIL, THE AENEID. Translated loosely as "Beware of Thought Leaders
bearing gifts"-an allusion to the famous saying, "Beware of Greeks bearing
gifts," which refers to the gift of the Trojan Horse that proved so dangerous.
176 See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying
text.
CRISIs
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it is not okay for regulators to accept that they can't fully understand
what is going on, nor is it okay to simply parrot the claims of the
technology's loudest proponents, cowed by the threat of derision for
holding back innovation.1 7 7
Further, regulators should be vigilant in searching for errors
and oversimplified language in even academic works that they read
about blockchain technology.17 1
Thus, in their education process on blockchain technology,
regulators cannot skip steps, analyzing only the implications of the
technology and treating the capabilities of the technology as proven.
Regulators and policymakers seem to be jumping ahead to questions
like "What are the implications for property records if we have a
secure, immutable, reliable record keeping system?" rather than fully
interrogating whether all (or any) variations of blockchain technology
have these features. 179 Again, this is analogous to the steps that were
skipped in the analysis of mortgage-backed securities and credit default
swaps, when people jumped ahead to ask "What are the wonderful
things that can be facilitated if we have managed to do away with risk
by dividing it up in complicated, opaque structures?"so
1' See supra id. Gerding makes a similar argument regarding complex risk
models and financial products, stating that "Regulators cannot outsource
oversight . . to risk models and other codes without thoroughly and continuously auditing [them]. . . . [T]his auditing requires both technical expertise
and a constant critical examination of technical assumptions. Regulators cannot abdicate responsibility to examine codes because they are embedded in
a complex technology or involve elegant economic models." Gerding, supra
note 77, at 186.
171 See supra Part VB.2 (discussing how misleading "facts" become immutable).
1' I made an analogous argument in an earlier paper, arguing that regulators
and commentators had largely focused their analysis of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies on how they could be categorized in the existing regulatory structure, rather than focusing on the fundamental characteristics of the technology and its risks and capabilities. See Walch, supra note 98, at 883-85.
1I See, e.g., Alan Greenspan, Chairman Fed. Reserve, Remarks to the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago's Forty-first Annual Conference on Bank Structure:
Risk Transfer and Financial Stability (May 5, 2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/Speeches/2005/20050505/default.htm
[https://penma.
cc/9BBT-ADY7] ("The use of a growing array of derivatives and the related
application of more-sophisticated approaches to measuring and managing
risk are key factors underpinning the greater resilience of our largest financial institutions, which was so evident during the credit cycle of 2001-02 and
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The fun part of the analysis of any new practice or technology
is thinking about the positive "what ifs," assuming that the features
of the new practice or technology are as described. That is the role
that "thought leaders" play, pushing society to imagine a brighter
future. While the expression of these ideas is important to help us
move forward with hope for the future, acute critique alongside claims
of transformation is essential."' With blockchain technology, the
thought leaders' visions are that many human problems can be solved,
including those of regulators. With a real-time view ofthe actions ofthe
parties they regulate, regulators will have solid knowledge with which
to make decisions, enabling sounder decisions and preventing events
like Lehman Brothers' collapse. 18 2 The gifts offered by the thought
leaders are enticing indeed, but regulators' jobs are to scrutinize these
gifts to see if they are everything they appear to be, and, as with the
Trojan Horse, what other surprises may lurk inside the packages.
Regulators must therefore be hyper-critical and skeptical
about blockchain technology itself They must insist upon precision in
understanding precisely how the technology achieves what it achieves,
how its capabilities change as different features are tweaked, which
unstated assumptions are made in describing the technology's benefits
and risks, what those assumptions are based on, what each word of
jargon means in the relevant fields involved, and so much more. It is
not enough for decisions to be made with a high-level understanding
that any and all forms of blockchain technology create a golden record
"by collaboration, by cryptography and by some clever code."1 8 3

which seems to have persisted.").
18 See Drezner, supra note 108 (noting the differing roles that thought leaders
and public intellectuals play in the distribution of ideas in society, and the
need for public intellectuals to provide critique to balance thought leaders'
less-nuanced and sometimes-overstated claims).
182 J. Christopher Giancarlo, Comm'r, U.S. Commodities Future Trading
Comm'n, Special Address at the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation
2016 Blockchain Symposium: Regulators and the Blockchain: First, Do No
Hann (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/
opagiancarlo-13 [https://perma.cc/CBF7-2975].
183 Don Tapscott, How the blockchain is changing money and business, TED
(June 2016), https://www.ted.com/talks/don tapscott how the blockchain_
is_changingmoney and business/transcript?language=en
[https://perma.
cc/EJ7Y-4XEZ] (received over 1.6 million views from August 2016 through
April 21, 2017).
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Don't Just Follow the Herd: Resist Peer
Pressure

Regulators are not immune to peer pressure, more scientifically
referred to as "herd behavior.""' In the current climate, regulators and
others may feel compelled to praise or use blockchain technology
simply because others are doing it. If regulators or policymakers see
others considering the use of blockchain technology for central bank
digital currencies, or for property records, they may feel pressured to
do the same, possibly to appear open to innovation or to draw jobs
to their locale, or because they want to ensure they are not missing
out on a legitimately useful technology. Given that the adoption of
new technologies is also subject to herd behavior,' the problematic
language of blockchain technology means that there is potential for
misunderstandings about the technology to drive adoption, rather than
actual capabilities.
As regulators observe what their counterparts are doing, and
consult with them as I suggested in Part V.A, they do risk triggering
"thoughtless herd behavior." 18 6 The use of problematic blockchain
terminology in the conversations among different regulators means
that any errors in understanding can be passed like a virus among them,
potentially resulting in the entire herd sharing that misunderstanding.
Again, this is important because of the high number of critical systems
that blockchain technology seeks to disrupt.
As countless wall posters in classrooms around the world
proclaim, "What is popular is not always right, and what is right is not
" See Heshan Sun, A Longitudinal Study of Herd Behavior in the Adoption
and ContinuedUse of Technology, 37 MGMT. INFO. Sys. Q. 1013, 1014 (2013)
("Herd behavior refers to the phenomenon that evelyone does what everyone
else is doing, even when their private information suggests doing something
quite different.") (citations omitted).
" See id. at 1014 (noting that herd behavior "may explain why people quickly converge on the same form of technology by imitating each other's choices. . . . [W]hen herding, people may later reexamine and reverse their initial
decisions, somewhat accounting for the en masse abandonment of a particular technology").
186 See Tom C.W. Lin, The New FinancialIndustry, 65 ALA. L. REV. 567, 608
(2014) ("Too much coordination could lead to "destructive coordination,"
which could result in thoughtless herd behavior by regulators and participants. Too much coordination can also erode competition among regulators
with different areas of focus and expertise.") (citations omitted).
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always popular." 8 7 Regulators need to have the courage to think for
themselves, even as they consult with and learn from others.

Following the suggestions in this Part V undoubtedly slows
things down, as regulators have to build their understanding of the
technology and its implications from the ground up. Indeed, through
their education and critical approach, regulators may end up helping to
create the set of facts about the technology. It is much more efficient
to listen to a single perspective and assume everything one hears is
true, than to spend time collecting diverse opinions and interrogating
every bit of information one receives. It is also exciting to believe that
a new technology will solve countless intractable human problems.
Taking a slow, inquisitive, and deliberative approach is in tension with
the need to quickly get up to speed on the technology to ensure that
imminent risks are identified and addressed efficiently. And there are
pressures analogous to those in the pharmaceutical industry, where
there are tradeoffs between making a helpful treatment available
quickly to those who could benefit from it, and fully understanding the
risks posed by the treatment. If blockchain technology offers all the
benefits it is said to, then it is unsurprising that there is a rush to adopt
it in many sectors, and regulators do not want to be seen as holding
back beneficial societal progress.
Scholars of the regulation of innovation have offered various
ways to approach regulating under uncertainty,"' but a detailed
discussion of these approaches and their merits is outside the scope
of this paper.

This saying is variously attributed to Albert Einstein or Howard Cosell.
1I See, e.g., Lin, supra note 186, at 619-20 (proposing the use of sunset provisions and mandated reviews in the regulation of "cyborg finance"); Vincent
R. Johnson, Nanotechnology, EnvironmentalRisks, andRegulatory Options,
121 PENN ST. L. REV. 471 (2016) (proposing the use of "soft law" for the initial governance of nanotechnology); Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation for
Innovation, in PERSPECTIVES IN LAW, BusINss AND INNOVATION (Mark Fenwick
et al. eds., 2016) (surveying the proposals made of how to regulate fast-moving innovations and proposing dynamic regulation for innovation).
117
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Conclusion

In this article, I have sought to illuminate one of the myriad
challenges facing regulators as they grapple with how to treat
blockchain technology-the technology's fluid, contested vocabulary.
Such a shifting terminology can cause a variety of problems for
regulators, and I offer suggestions to minimize its negative effects,
through extensive education that incorporates a critical mindset. I am
hopeful that awareness of language difficulties, and consideration of
how they can result in misunderstandings, will improve the situation,
much as awareness of cognitive biases may reduce their impact on
decision making.18 9
The struggles regulators (and the rest of us) face in uncovering
the "facts" about blockchain technology mirror those in the current
public discussion of "fake news." When different interest groups have
reasons (e.g., money, fame, power) to tell a certain story to the rest of
the world, it is difficult to find the kernels oftruth in diverging accounts.
Language choices undoubtedly help to shade facts in various ways,
just as they do in the discourse around blockchain technology. The
irony, of course, is that blockchain technology purports to offer us the
solution to our perennial struggles in identifying and preserving truth.
A blockchain record is said to show us the truth, the "golden copy."1 9 0
As the Arizona statute claims, the data on it "provides an uncensored
truth."1 9 1 Yet the truths about the technology and its capabilities remain
unclear and contested because they are still in flux and shrouded in a
fog of confusing terminology.
As the law evolves around blockchain technology, or whatever
we end up calling it, my suggestions in fighting through problematic
vocabulary may prove useful in approaching fintech more broadly,
and I am hopeful that language problems will not stop us from making
full and relatively safe use of this technology. In the end, contested
language around the technology reflects the underlying uncertainties
about the forms the technology will ultimately take, so until these
" See, e.g., L. Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in
YALE L.J. 862 (2017) (reviewing NICOLE VAN

the Criminal Courtroom, 126

CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA'S LARGEST CRIM-

(2016)) (discussing how awareness of implicit biases through
education may help to reduce their influence on decisions).
190 Tinianow & Long, supra note 35.
191 H.B. 2417, 53rd Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017).
INAL COURT
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more fundamental issues are resolved, the language around blockchain
technology will continue to evolve. Thus, for the moment, the path of
the blockchain lexicon is a winding and undefined one, and law must
do its best to follow it.

